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1190 
Indefinite Detention and Antiterrorism 
Laws: Balancing Security and Human 
Rights 
 
Dr. JoAnne M. Sweeny 
 
I.    Introduction 
 
In February 2013, over 100 of the 166 detainees at the United 
States’ prison in Guantanamo Bay in Cuba staged a hunger strike to 
protest their detentions.
1
  These hunger strikes led to a brief flurry of 
media and political detention but have resulted in no substantive changes 
to existing law or policy.
2
  Although the detainees at Guantanamo Bay 
have received the most media attention, they are not the only “lifers” 
being indefinitely detained under the PATRIOT Act.  Thousands are 
currently being held – because they are suspected terrorists or because 
they cannot legally be deported – in prisons or immigration detention 
facilities across the United States without any hope of release.
3
  The 
United States is not the only country that responded to terrorist threats 
with indefinite detention of suspects.  In the aftermath of September 11, 
 
 Assistant Professor of Law, University of Louisville, Louis D. Brandeis School of Law.  
PhD, Queen Mary, University of London.  A previous version of this paper was presented 
at the American Association of Law Schools Section on International Human Rights in 
January 2013, at the Junior Scholar’s Virtual Colloquium in July 2013, and the Loyola 
Constitutional Colloquium in November 2013.  Many thanks to the commentators at 
these conferences, particularly Professors Diane Marie Amann, Jessica Kiser and Kellen 
Zale.  Additional thanks to Francesca Laguardia, Philip Heleringer and Martin French for 
their assistance with this article.  Any remaining errors are solely the author’s. 
1. Peter Finn, Number of Protesting Guantanamo Bay Detainees Being Force-fed 
Grows to 41,WASH. POST, June 7, 2013, at A06, available at 2013 WLNR 13987748; 
Amy Goodman, Guantanamo a Legal Morass, SPOKESMAN-REV. (Spokane, Wash.), Mar. 
15, 2013, at 11A, available at 2013 WLNR 6580493. 
2. Jared Del Rosso, What the Guantanamo Hunger Strikers Achieved, HUFFINGTON 
POST, Aug. 8, 2013, available at 2013 WLNR 19583167; Peter Finn, Hearings Open for 
9/11 Suspects, WASH. POST, June 18, 2013, at A03, available at 2013 WLNR 14852471; 
Finn, supra note 1; Goodman, supra note 1. 
3. It is unclear exactly how many people are being detained under the PATRIOT 
Act.  After the Department of Justice announced that it had detained 1147 persons seven 
weeks after it began investigating the events of September 11, it has refused to provide 
any updates to that total.  Erwin Chemerinsky, Losing Liberties: Applying a Foreign 
Intelligence Model to Domestic Law Enforcement, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1619, 1634 (2004). 
1
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2001, the United Kingdom also enacted legislation to indefinitely detain 
terrorism suspects who could not be legally deported.
4
 
Indefinite detention of suspected terrorists presents a unique conflict 
between the desire for security and preservation of constitutional or 
human rights.  Both the United States and United Kingdom have 
struggled with how to balance these rights, and their respective 
government branches have engaged in repeated conflicts to find the right 
balance.  The saga is still ongoing in both countries and represents a 
powerful look into how governments create and modify laws that deal 
with complicated political and moral issues.  How these laws were made, 
the inter-governmental conflicts they create, and the way these conflicts 
are resolved – through compromise or “steamrolling” – provide unique 
insights into the working of the government itself. 
Therefore, this article does more than describe British and American 
anti-terrorism laws; it shows how those laws go through conflicted 
government branches and the bargains struck to create the anti-terrorism 
laws that exist today.  Instead of taking these laws as given, this Article 
explains why they exist.  More specifically, this article focuses on the 
path anti-terrorism legislation followed in the United States and the 
United Kingdom, with particular focus on each country’s ability (or lack 
thereof) to indefinitely detain suspected non-citizen terrorists.  Both 
countries’ executives sought to have that power and both were limited by 
the legislatures and courts but in different ways.  These differences show 
the human rights concerns both countries grappled with when enacting 
anti-terrorism legislation and how the two governments approached 
balancing those concerns. 
These anti-terrorism laws also show which government branches 
possessed the most power when creating the legislation, which branches 
dictated the terms of these laws, and which branches were forced to 
compromise.  The different paths taken by the anti-terrorism legislation 
in both countries also show the different styles of the two governments.  
The branches of the United States government are more likely to openly 
defy each other, knowing that checks and balances will ensure that no 
branch dominates.  In the United Kingdom, there is no strong tradition of 
checks and balances so informal bargaining and consulting among the 
branches is more common before legislation is proposed or amended. 
The United Kingdom’s Human Rights Act has, however, begun to 
 
4. See generally Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, c. 21-35 (U.K.). 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss3/6
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change the culture and has caused more open opposition among the three 
branches. 
 
II.    Creating Antiterrorism Laws 
 
The events of September 11, 2001 changed the way the world 
looked at terrorism.
5
  Although many nations experienced terrorist 
attacks within their borders prior to 2001, many legislators argued that 
modern terrorists are fundamentally different and require a different legal 
response.
6
  Both the United States and United Kingdom responded to the 
terrorist attacks on September 11 with harsh anti-terrorism measures that 
included the ability to effectively indefinitely detain suspected terrorists 
without trial.  However, the journeys these countries took to reach this 
result were remarkably different.  The United States PATRIOT Act and 
the United Kingdom’s Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act (“Anti-
Terrorism Act”) both contain provisions for potentially indefinite 
detention of suspected terrorists and, as shown below, the provisions 
have met with different levels of resistance by the courts and the 
legislature. The different journeys these laws took therefore give unique 
insight into the way these two countries’ government branches make law. 
 
A. The United States 
 
The United States’ anti-terrorism policies were fundamentally 
altered by the attacks on September 11, 2001.  Although the United 
States did have anti-terrorism policies in place before 2001, those laws 
were much less substantive and were primarily used to punish those who 
committed terrorist acts rather than trying to prevent terrorism.
7
 
 
5. Sarah Collerton, Ten Years of Anti-terror Laws, ABC NEWS, Sept. 12, 2011, 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2011-09-12/ten-years-of-anti-terror-laws/2881034; Martha 
Mendoza, Nations Turned to Anti-terrorism Laws as Shield — and Sword — After 9/11, 
SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 3, 2011, http://seattletimes.com/text/2016104402.html (“[s]ince 
9/11, almost every country has passed or revised anti-terrorism laws, from tiny Tonga to 
giant China.”). 
6. Edel Hughes, Entrenched Emergencies and the “War on Terror”: Time to 
Reform the Derogation Procedure in International Law?, 20 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 1, 1 
(2007); see also Monica Hakimi, International Standards for Detaining Terrorism 
Suspects: Moving Beyond the Armed Conflict-Criminal Divide, 40 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L 
L. 593, 594 (2009) (describing how transnational jihadist groups do not operate on a 
traditional battlefield). 
7. Andrew Peterson, Addressing Tomorrow’s Terrorists, 2 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & 
3
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1.   Anti-terrorism Laws and Indefinite Detention Prior to 
September 11, 2001 
 
One of the earliest uses of the term “terrorism” was an effort to 
exclude immigrants who engaged in terrorist activity.
8
  Until the 1993 
World Trade Center bombings, the United States did not have any 
substantive criminal laws generally addressing domestic terrorism and 
instead focused on using immigration laws to keep suspected terrorists 
out of the United States.
9
  After the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, 
there was an even greater push to implement anti-terrorism laws aimed at 
domestic terrorism.
10
  The first of these statutes was the Anti-Terrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).
11
  Passed on the one-year 
anniversary of the Oklahoma City bombing, the AEDPA’s stated main 
purpose was to help prevent terrorist attacks by “streamlining” death 
penalty and habeas corpus proceedings.
12
  More specifically, the AEDPA 
allowed states under some circumstances to “fast-track” death penalty 
proceedings, and forced federal courts to give more deference to state 
court decisions in habeas corpus proceedings.
13
  In addition to removing 
procedural hurdles, the AEDPA also included a broad definition of what 
criminal behavior constituted “terrorism” and increased punishments for 
engaging in terrorist activity.
14
  During this time, those who committed 
terrorist attacks against United States targets on foreign soil were often 
given fewer constitutional protections, even if they were being 
interrogated by American agents.
15
 
 
POL’Y 297, 301 (2008). 
8. Id. at 306, 311. 
9. Id. at 316, 318. 
10. Id. at 319; Jacqueline Ann Carberry, Note, Terrorism: A Global Phenomenon 
Mandating a Unified International Response, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 685, 688-89 
(1999); Patrick J. McDonnell, Sentenced to a Life in Limbo, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1998, at 
A1, available at 1998 WLNR 6365905. 
11. Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 
110 Stat. 1214. 
12. Charles V. Zehren, Clearing the Hurdle: House Sends Anti-terrorism Bill to 
Clinton, NEWSDAY, Apr. 19, 1996 at A20, available at 1996 WLNR 550302. 
13. John H. Blume, AEDPA: The "Hype" and the "Bite", 91 CORNELL L. REV. 259, 
259-60 (2006). 
14. Peterson, supra note 7, at 320. 
15. See, e.g., United States v. Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d 168, 196-97 (S.D.N.Y. 
2001) (holding that detained suspects who were not notified of their right to notify their 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss3/6
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The AEDPA also mandated that all lawfully-admitted convicted, 
aggravated felons be deported or, if they could not be deported, held 
indefinitely.
16
  Aliens are usually detained indefinitely after a deportation 
order for two reasons: the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) 
“is unable to carry out the deportation because the alien’s country of 
origin refuses to readmit her . . . or the alien is generally considered 
ineligible for release because she is too dangerous to release or is likely 
to flee and frustrate deportation.”17 
The INS’s ability to indefinitely detain aliens who cannot be 
deported was further codified in the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), also passed in 1996.
18
  The 
IIRIRA’s main focus was immigration: it reinforced the U.S. Border 
Patrol, cracked down on the employment and smuggling of illegal aliens, 
and imposed new restrictions on the ability of legal immigrants to obtain 
government benefits.
19
 Section 241.4 of the IIRIRA states that criminal 
aliens that have been ordered removed may be detained beyond the 
removal period if the alien demonstrates a serious risk of non-compliance 
with the removal order.
20
  Under subsequent regulations, reviews of non-
removable criminal aliens were to be held at least once a year.
21
 After 
enactment, the AEDPA and IIRIRA were criticized for being unduly 
harsh towards immigrants
22
 and the wrongly convicted.
23
 
 
consulates of their detentions—which violated the Vienna Convention—had no judicial, 
only a political, remedy for this violation). 
16. Stacy J. Borisov, Give Me Liberty or Give Me Deportation: The Indefinite 
Detention of Non-Removable, Criminal Aliens, 13 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 183, 191-92 
(2001).  Under the AEDPA, the INS no longer has discretion to admit these aliens even if 
the INS determines that they are not a danger to society. Id. 
17. Alexandra E. Chopin, Disappearing Due Process: The Case for Indefinitely 
Detained Permanent Residents' Retention of Their Constitutional Entitlement Following 
a Deportation Order, 49 EMORY L.J. 1261, 1274 (2000). 
18. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546. 
19. Senate Votes, 97-3, to Tighten Borders: Bill also Limits Benefits for Legal 
Immigrants, WASH. POST, May 3, 1996, at A01, available at 1996 WLNR 6473307. 
20. Megan Peitzke, The Fate of "Unremovable" Aliens Before and After September 
11, 2001: The Supreme Court's Presumptive Six-Month Limit to Post-Removal-Period 
Detention, 30 PEPP. L. REV. 769, 776 (2003). 
21. 8 C.F.R § 241.4(k)(2) (2011). 
22. Mary A. Mitchell, Reforms Limit Immigrants' Legal Options, CHI. SUN-TIMES, 
Jan. 19, 1997, at 13, available at 1997 WLNR 7145872. 
23. Editorial, Basic Rights Are the Victims, BOSTON GLOBE, May 9, 1997 at A22, 
available at 1997 WLNR 2355318. 
5
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As a result of these laws, by 2001, the United States was 
indefinitely detaining over 3,400 deportable aliens who had been rejected 
by their home countries.
24
  Numerous habeas corpus petitions were 
brought by these detained aliens, which resulted in a circuit split between 
the Ninth and Fifth Circuits.  In the Ninth Circuit, in Ma v. Reno,
25
 the 
petitioner argued that the INS was violating his due process rights 
because he was being indefinitely detained after being ordered removed 
to Cambodia, which would not permit his return because Cambodia had 
no repatriation agreement with United States.  The Ninth Circuit granted 
the petitioner’s habeas corpus petition and held that the INS may “detain 
aliens only for a reasonable time beyond the statutory removal period.”26  
If there is “no reasonable likelihood that a foreign government will 
accept the alien’s return in the reasonably foreseeable future . . . the alien 
must be released subject to the supervisory authority provided in the 
statute.” 27 
The Fifth Circuit took a different view.  In Zadvydas v. 
Underdown,
28
 a resident alien was being indefinitely held because he was 
“stateless” and had no other country to which he could be deported.  The 
Fifth Circuit denied habeas corpus relief, reasoning that Zadvydas was 
not being indefinitely detained because he could “be released when it is 
determined that he is no longer either a threat to the community or a 
flight risk.”29  The Fifth Circuit also noted that Zadvydas’s detention was 
reviewed every six months at which time he could present evidence that 
supported his release.
 30
  Finally, the Fifth Circuit held that, although 
finding a country to which the petitioner could be deported would be 
“difficult at best,” the Fifth Circuit thought that more time should be 
given to the INS before deciding that such deportation would be 
 
24. Carberry, supra note 10, at 688-89; Michelle Mittelstadt, INS to Begin 
Releasing Long-Detained Immigrants, CONTRA COSTA TIMES (Walnut Creek, CA), July 
20, 2001. 
25. Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 2000), vacated sub nom. Zadvydas v. Davis, 
533 U.S. 678 (2001), opinion modified sub nom. Kim Ho Ma v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1095 
(9th Cir. 2001). 
26. Ma, 208 F.3d at 821-22. 
27. Id. 
28. Zadvydas v. Underdown, 185 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 1999), vacated sub nom. 
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), opinion withdrawn and superseded sub nom. 
Zadvydas v. Davis, 285 F.3d 398 (5th Cir. 2002). 
29. Zadvydas, 185 F.3d, at 291. 
30. Id. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss3/6
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impossible.
 31
 
In 2001, the Supreme Court consolidated Ma and Zadvydas and 
finally decided the issue.
32
  The Supreme Court’s primary concern was 
whether the statute actually permitted indefinite detention of an alien, 
because doing so would violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.
33
  More specifically, the Court held that “government 
detention violates that Clause unless the detention is ordered in a 
criminal proceeding with adequate procedural protections or, in certain 
special and narrow nonpunitive circumstances where a special 
justification, such as harm-threatening mental illness, outweighs the 
individual’s constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical 
restraint.”34  The Court determined that the proceedings were civil and 
nonpunitive in purpose and effect but also held that there was no 
“sufficiently strong special justification . . . for indefinite civil 
detention.” 35  The Government’s two stated goals, ensuring that the alien 
appears at immigration proceedings and protecting the community, were 
held to be insufficient for two reasons.
36
  First, once the alien cannot be 
reasonably deported, the reason for detaining her no longer exists.
37
  
Second, although the alien may still be a danger to the community no 
matter how long she is detained, whatever “danger” the alien poses does 
not rise to the level previously allowed by the Supreme Court, 
particularly with the small amount of procedural safeguards included in 
the statute.
38
 
The Supreme Court also held that, under the statute, detention is 
potentially permanent and the length of detention is not determined by 
the alien’s danger to the community but by whether the alien can be 
deported.  The Court noted that “[t]he provision authorizing detention 
does not apply narrowly to a small segment of particularly dangerous 
individuals, say, suspected terrorists, but broadly to aliens ordered 
removed for many and various reasons, including tourist visa 
violations.”39  The procedural protections for the aliens were also 
 
31. Id. 
32. 533 U.S. 678 (2001). 
33. Id. 
34. Id. at 690 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
35. Id. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. at 691. 
39. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
7
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criticized because the alien bears the burden of proving he is not 
dangerous and there is no significant judicial review of the administrative 
proceedings.
 40
  To the Supreme Court, “[t]he Constitution demands 
greater procedural protection even for property.” 41 
Noting that the relevant statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), contained no 
“clear indication of congressional intent to grant the Attorney General 
the power to hold indefinitely in confinement an alien ordered removed,” 
the Court held that § 1231 “contains an implicit ‘reasonable time’ 
limitation, the application of which is subject to federal-court review.”42 
The Court then held that there should be a rebuttable presumption 
that six months is a “reasonable time:” 
 
for the sake of uniform administration in the federal 
courts, we recognize that period. After this 6-month 
period, once the alien provides good reason to believe 
that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the 
reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must 
respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing. 
And for detention to remain reasonable, as the period of 
prior postremoval confinement grows, what counts as 
the “reasonably foreseeable future” conversely would 
have to shrink.
43
 
 
The end result, according to the Court, is that “once removal is no longer 
reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is no longer authorized by 
statute.”44 
In response to the Supreme Court’s holding in Zadvydas, the 
Attorney General directed the INS to implement regulations “that set 
forth a procedure for detained aliens to follow in presenting claims that 
they should be released from detention because there is no significant 
likelihood that they will be removed in the foreseeable future.”45  The 
INS promulgated regulations that created a hearing procedure and 
 
40. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
41. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
42. Id. at 682. 
43. Id. at 701. 
44. Id. at 699. 
45. Attorney General Issues Interim Procedure for Post-Order Custody Review 
after Zadvydas, July 30, 2001, 78 No. 29 Interpreter Releases 1228, 1228-29. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss3/6
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delineated factors that would enable the INS to indefinitely detain 
unremovable aliens.
46
 Under 8 C.F.R. § 241.13, Aliens that are released 
are still under an order of supervision, which, among other things, 
requires them to report to INS officers periodically.
47
  Under 8 C.F.R. § 
241.14, the INS may continue to detain unremovable aliens if they 1) 
have “a highly contagious disease that is a threat to public safety;” 2) 
have been detained on account of “serious adverse foreign policy 
consequences of release;” 3) have been “detained on account of security 
or terrorism concerns;” or 4) are “determined to be specially dangerous” 
due to a history of violence, mental condition, or other factors that 
represent a danger to the public.
48
 
There was mixed response to Zadvydas in the media.  Supporters of 
existing immigration legislation thought that the Supreme Court was 
legislating by expanding the “rights of aliens” to be the same as 
citizens.
49
 Others saw the Supreme Court decision as repudiating the 
former level of deference it had given to the government on immigration 
policies and emphasizing that Constitutional rights apply to all “persons” 
in the United States, whether there illegally or legally.
50
 Favorable media 
reports also emphasized that the decision gave resolution to “lifers” who 
were being held indefinitely by the INS.
51
  However, years after 
Zadvydas, criticisms still arise when the INS releases illegal aliens who 
cannot be deported. 
52
 
Unsurprisingly, several lawsuits were initiated after Zadvydas, some 
of which resulted in the release of detained immigrants.  For example, in 
Rosales-Garcia v. Holland, 322 F.3d 386, 405-06 (6th Cir. 2003), the 
Sixth Circuit extended Zadvydas to inadmissible aliens, not just 
removable ones.  Due to this decision, two Mariel Cubans
53
 who had 
 
46. 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.13-14 (2013). 
47. Id. §§ 241.13, 241.5. 
48. Id. § 241.14. 
49. Charles Lane & Hanna Rosin, Court Limits Detention of Immigrants; Justices 
Rule Convicts Can't Be Held Indefinitely, WASH. POST, June 29, 2001, at A01, available 
at 2001 WLNR 13187510. 
50. Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court: The Issue of Confinement; Supreme 
Court Limits Detention In Cases of Deportable Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2001, 
at A1, available at 2001 WLNR 3383917. 
51. Lane & Rosin, supra note 49. 
52. Rich Cholodofsky, Inability to Deport 'Undesirable' Illegals Frustrates U.S., 
TRIB. REV. (Greensburg, Pa.), Mar. 27, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 5951623. 
53. “Mariel Cubans” refers to Cubans who mass immigrated to the United States on 
a boatlift from Mariel Harbor in 1980. Rosales-Garcia v. Holland, 322 F.3d 386, 390-391 
9
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served prison time for criminal convictions were released from INS 
custody because Cuba, the only country to which they could be deported, 
refused to accept them.
54
 
8 C.F.R. § 241.14 has led to further litigation, which resulted in 
another Circuit split between the Fifth and Tenth Circuits.  The Fifth 
Circuit held that 8 C.F.R. § 241.14 could not authorize indefinite 
detention for any aliens covered by its authorizing statute, 8 U.S.C. § 
1231, because the Supreme Court had already held that indefinite 
detention was not permitted under that statute.
55
  Conversely, the Tenth 
Circuit has allowed indefinite detention under 8 C.F.R. § 241.14 because 
the regulations limit indefinite detention to “special circumstances,” such 
as mental illness, that show that the alien represents a specific danger to 
the public.
56
  The Tenth Circuit also noted that “the burden of proof is 
now on the agency to prove dangerousness, rather than on the alien to 
show non-dangerousness. In order to continue detention beyond the 
removal period because an alien poses a special danger to the public, the 
government must first demonstrate that there is ‘reasonable cause to go 
forward with a merits hearing.’” 57 According to the Tenth Circuit, the 
narrow set of “special circumstances” and reversed burden of proof in 8 
C.F.R. § 241.14 comported with the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Zadvydas.
 58
 
 
2.   Post-September 11 – The PATRIOT Act 
 
As shown above, prior to September 11, 2001, existing terrorism 
laws were concerned with deporting aliens who had committed 
aggravated crimes.
59
  Those concerns expanded after the attacks on the 
World Trade Center and resulted in new anti-terrorism legislation that 
impacts the detention of unremovable aliens.  The PATRIOT Act was 
proposed in direct response to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 
 
(6th Cir. 2003). 
54. Id. at 391-92; see also, e.g., Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 
2006); Ly v. Hansen, 351 F.3d 263 (6th Cir. 2003). 
55. Tran v. Mukasey, 515 F.3d 478, 484 (5th Cir. 2008). 
56. Hernandez-Carrera v. Carlson, 547 F.3d 1237, 1253-54 (10th Cir. 2008). 
57. Id. (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(h) (2013)). 
58. Hernandez-Carrera, 547 F.3d at 1253-54. 
59. See, e.g., Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub. 
L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996). 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss3/6
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2001.
60
  What became the PATRIOT Act was originally proposed by the 
Bush administration and championed by Attorney General John Ashcroft 
as necessary because of the “clear and present danger” of further terrorist 
attacks.
61
  Ashcroft also warned that the United States faced a “serious 
threat” of additional terrorism, particularly after it launched retaliatory 
strikes.
62
 
It is perhaps no wonder, then, that the PATRIOT Act was quickly 
passed by Congress.  “One of the swiftest-moving bills in federal history, 
the law was proposed five days after the Sept. 11 terror attacks.”63  
September 11 brought bipartisan cooperation that would have been 
“inconceivable” before the attacks.64  Due to this cooperation, the 
PATRIOT Act was passed on October 26, 2001, six weeks after 
September 11.
65
  The PATRIOT Act was also passed with a sizeable 
majority; one senator voted against it
66
 and sixty-six representatives (out 
of 432) voted against it.
67
  September 11 was clearly on Congress’ mind 
as they considered the bill; many members of Congress had recently 
traveled to New York to view the devastation at the World Trade 
Center.
68
  The speed with which the bill went through Congress caused 
some members to complain that “they had no idea what they were voting 
on, [and] were fearful that aspects of the . . . bill went too far—yet voted 
for it anyway, lest there be a further terrorist attack and they be accused 
of not having provided the government sufficient means to defend 
 
60. Dana Milbank, House Bill Would Expand Federal Detention Powers, WASH. 
POST, Oct. 2, 2001, at A01, available at 2001 WLNR 13155248. 
61. Id. 
62. Kevin Johnson, Ashcroft: New Terror Likely, USA TODAY, Oct. 1, 2001 at 01A, 
available at 2001 WLNR 3769313. 
63. J. M. Lawrence, War on Terrorism; Anti-terror Laws in Place; Feds Urgently 
Implement Crackdown, BOSTON HERALD, October 27, 2001, available at 2001 WLNR 
267021. 
64. Zachary Coile & Elizabeth Fernandez, Bill to Fight Terrorism Takes Shape: 
Extension of Police Powers Stops Short of Ashcroft’s Request, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 2, 2001, 
at A1, available at  2001 WLNR 5723393. 
65. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required 
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107–56, 115 Stat. 272. 
66. UNITED STATES SENATE, U.S. SENATE ROLL CALL VOTES 107TH CONGRESS-1ST 
SESSION, 
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=1
07&session=1&vote=00313 (last visited Apr. 25, 2014). 
67. UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, FINAL VOTE RESULTS FOR ROLL 
CALL 398, http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2001/roll398.xml (last visited Apr. 25, 2014). 
68. Milbank, supra note 60. 
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against it.”69 
The Bush Administration hoped that the aftermath of September 11 
would cause Congress to pass the legislation it wanted without much 
debate.
70
 However, despite the Bush Administration’s pressure, Congress 
did amend provisions of the bill.
71
  Members of Congress were 
particularly wary of some of the powers that Ashcroft sought such as 
wiretapping and indefinite detention of suspected terrorists.  
Representative Robert L. Barr Jr., a conservative Republican from 
Georgia, noted that “the department has sought many of these authorities 
on numerous other occasions, has been unsuccessful in obtaining them, 
and now seeks to take advantage of what is obviously an emergency 
situation to obtain authorities that it has been unable to obtain previously. 
. .”72  For example, the PATRIOT Act allows “enemy combatants” to be 
held indefinitely, as long as some procedural safeguards (such as habeas 
corpus) are provided to them.
 73
 
The PATRIOT Act also allows the government to detain any 
foreigners suspected of terrorist activity for up to seven days without 
filing charges or giving them an opportunity to ask a judge to release 
them.
74
  Civil libertarians complained about this provision, but some had 
to admit that it was a lot better than the original version of the bill – 
Attorney General John Ashcroft had sought indefinite detention of 
immigrants without a hearing if they were suspected of involvement in 
terrorist acts.
75
  Still, indefinite detention is possible under the PATRIOT 
Act: the Attorney General has the power to detain both legal and illegal 
immigrants until they are deported, as long as he or she has “reasonable 
 
69. Stampeded in the House, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, Oct. 16, 2001, available at 
2001 WLNR 13691967. 
70. Neil A. Lews & Robert Pear, Bill to Expand Wiretap Rules but House Scales 
Back Other Requests for Expanded Powers, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Oct. 2, 2001, at A1, 
available at 2001 WLNR 3442295. 
71. John Lancaster & Walter Pincus, Proposed Anti-Terrorism Laws Draw Tough 
Questions; Lawmakers Express Concerns to Ashcroft, Other Justice Officials About 
Threat to Civil Liberties, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 2001, at A05, available at 2001 WLNR 
13162112. 
72. Id. 
73. David Cole, Out of the Shadows: Preventive Detention, Suspected Terrorists, 
and War, 97 CAL. L. REV. 693, 702 (2009); Hope Metcalf & Judith Resnik, Gideon at 
Guantanamo: Democratic and Despotic Detention, 122 YALE L.J. 2504, 2517 (2013). 
74. Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 1629. 
75. Coile & Fernandez, supra note 64; Milbank, supra note 60. 
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grounds to believe” that they may be involved in terrorism.76 
More specifically, § 412 of the PATRIOT Act requires the Attorney 
General to “take into custody any alien who is certified” as a terrorist 
suspect or “is engaged in any other activity that endangers the national 
security of the United States.”77 If removal to another country is unlikely 
to occur in the near future, this section allows the Attorney General to 
detain the alien for up to six months, with renewable six-month terms.
78
  
These six-month detentions can go on indefinitely.
79
  The PATRIOT Act 
does allow for judicial review in the form of habeas corpus proceedings, 
first to any district court having jurisdiction and then (via appeal) to the 
D.C. Circuit, which is statutorily limited to using only D.C. Circuit or 
U.S. Supreme Court cases as precedent.
80
 
 
3.   Media Response 
 
The media harshly criticized the PATRIOT Act for the wide and 
largely unreviewable powers it granted to the executive.  According to 
one newspaper, the PATRIOT Act “[p]ermits the attorney general to 
incarcerate or detain foreigners based on mere suspicion.”81  Other media 
sources noted that the Bush administration also originally wanted the 
power to hold non-U.S. citizens suspected of engaging in terrorist 
activities indefinitely without being formally charged, but members of 
Congress forced the administration to make concessions.
82
  The 
PATRIOT Act was also criticized for not providing sufficient judicial 
 
76. Milbank, supra note 60. 
77. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (2012).  However, the Attorney General must begin removal 
proceedings within seven days of detention.  Id.  See also Tung Yin, The Impact of the 9-
11 Attacks on National Security Law Casebooks, 19 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 157, 171-
72 (2006). 
78. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). 
79. Id.  The Attorney General must review the detention every six months to make 
sure it satisfies the requirements of Section 1226(a).  Tran v. Mukasey, 515 F.3d 478, 
485 (5th Cir. 2008); Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1069, 1079 (9th Cir. 2006). 
80. 28 U.S.C. §2241, held unconstitutional by Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 
(2008). 
81. Terror Bill: Fear Wins, Rights Lose, WISCONSIN STATE J., Oct. 28, 2001, at B2, 
available at 2001 WLNR 8774605. 
82. Kelly Wallace, Bush Signs Anti-Terrorism Bill Into Law, CNN, Oct. 26, 2001, 
http://transcripts.cnn.com/transcrips/0110/26/se.01.html. As a compromise decision, the 
PATRIOT Act allows prosecutors to hold these suspected terrorists for up to seven days 
without filing charges against them, which concerned some media outlets.  Id. 
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review when federal agents “indefinitely detain hundreds of non-citizens 
whether or not they are here legally.”83  Despite these criticisms, 2001 
polls showed that fifty-eight percent of the population approved of the 
way George W. Bush handled the terrorist attacks.
84
 
 
4.   The Supreme Court’s Influence on the PATRIOT Act 
 
The Supreme Court’s influence on the PATRIOT Act began as it 
was being drafted.  It is evident that Congress looked at prior Supreme 
Court precedent for indefinite detention of non-nationals when drafting § 
1226a of the PATRIOT Act.  The six-month time limit on detention of 
non-nationals suspected of terrorism appears to have been taken directly 
from the Supreme Court’s holding in Zadvydas v. Davis85 in order to 
comply with Zadvydas’s holding that an alien who is held for more than 
six months has presumptively had his or her due process violated.
86
 
In fact, the Supreme Court noted Congress’ adoption of Zadvydas’s 
six-month presumption in the PATRIOT Act in Clark v. Martinez.
87
  
Clark v. Martinez, like the Sixth Circuit case of Rosales-Garcia v. 
Holland, extended Zadvydas to inadmissible aliens instead of just 
removable ones.
88
 In response to the Government’s argument “that the 
security of our borders will be compromised if it must release into the 
country inadmissible aliens who cannot be removed,” the Supreme Court 
noted that Congress could amend § 1231 to allow for indefinite detention 
under special circumstances, as it had with the PATRIOT Act.
 89
  
Congress’ acquiescence to the Supreme Court’s six-month renewable 
detention periods has led other courts to apply Zadvydas in other 
situations.  For example, courts have used the PATRIOT Act’s six-month 
review period to grant habeas to other kinds of unremovable aliens
90
 who 
 
83. Susan Goering, Anti-terrorism Act Imperils Liberties, BALT. SUN, Oct. 30, 2001, 
at 15A, available at 2001 WLNR 1048504. The PATRIOT Act allows habeas corpus 
petitions only for those who are indefinitely detained. 8 U.S.C. § 1226a(a)(1) (2012). 
84. Jane Lampman, Muslim in America, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 10, 2002, 
available at 2002 WLNR 1563069. 
85. 533 U.S. 678 (2001). 
86. Id. at 701. 
87. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 386 n.8 (2005). 
88. Id. at 378. 
89. Id. at 386 & n.8. 
90. One example involves an alien convicted of a crime of violence who was 
unremovable because the two countries to which he could be deported refused to accept 
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did not explicitly benefit from the PATRIOT Act’s procedural 
safeguards.
91
 
Congress’ acceptance of Zadvydas’s six-month detention limit is 
also evident in its subsequent creation of 8 C.F.R. § 241.14, which 
allows for continuing detention of aliens who meet specific criteria 
(including being suspected of terrorism) if proper review and hearings 
are conducted.
92
  These aliens are also entitled to petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus.
93
  This regulation has not been reviewed by the Supreme 
Court but has been upheld by the Eighth Circuit.
94
  However, no court 
has determined whether § 1226a’s indefinitely renewable six-month 
terms would violate Due Process. The Supreme Court noted in Zadvydas 
that “[a] statute permitting indefinite detention of an alien would raise a 
serious constitutional problem”95 but Zadvydas also explicitly did not 
apply to aliens that pose national security risks.
96
  It is unclear what the 
result of any litigation on this issue would be but, for now, the state of 
the law appears to be stable. 
The interplay between the three branches of government in the 
United States shows that these branches are comfortable with the explicit 
dialogue they traditionally share.  The legislature resisted the executive’s 
initial legislative proposal and amended it in several respects.  The fact 
that the media was also critical of the bill likely reinforced the 
legislature’s resolve.  In addition, the executive was willing to use 
existing Supreme Court cases (Zadvydas in particular) to draft some of 
the terms of the PATRIOT Act.  In response, the Supreme Court has 
noted that the PATRIOT Act followed its prior rulings and indicated that 
Congress should follow the PATRIOT Act as a model when drafting 
other legislation.  The long-standing tradition of separation of powers 
appears to be alive and well in these interactions.  In contrast, as shown 
 
him. Tran v. Mukasey, 515 F.3d 478, 480 (5th Cir. 2008). 
91. Mukasey, 515 F.3d at 485 (“In particular, in the field of national security, 
Congress enacted the Patriot Act which authorizes detention beyond the removal period 
of any alien whose removal is not foreseeable for additional periods of up to six months if 
the alien presents a national security threat. Thus, not only are the Government's concerns 
properly directed to Congress, but importantly Congress has shown that it has the 
authority and willingness to address these concerns.” (internal footnote and citation 
omitted)). 
92. 8 C.F.R. § 241.14 (2011). 
93. Id. 
94. Hernandez-Carrera v. Carlson, 547 F.3d 1237, 1255 (10th Cir. 2008). 
95. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). 
96. Id. at 696. 
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below, the interactions of the government branches in the United 
Kingdom are far from set. 
 
B.  The United Kingdom 
 
In contrast to the dearth of inter-governmental conflict seen in the 
United States, the path taken by the United Kingdom’s anti-terrorism 
legislation after September 11, 2011 is much more complex and involves 
several amendments in response to objections from Parliament, British 
Courts and the European Court of Human Rights.  The United 
Kingdom’s government structure and familiarity with terrorism are major 
causes of these differences.  In contrast, the enactment of the United 
Kingdom’s first codified bill of rights, the Human Rights Act, allowed 
the government branches to come into conflict in a more direct, 
“American” way that would not have been possible only two years 
earlier. 
In 2001, the Human Rights Act had only recently come into effect.  
In addition to incorporating the rights contained in the European 
Convention on Human Rights, the Human Rights Act gave new powers 
to the judiciary and created a new parliamentary committee to review 
legislation that impacted human rights.  Because the Human Rights Act 
is a fairly recent statute, the Anti-Terrorism Act is one of the few pieces 
of legislation that was proposed and enacted before the Human Rights 
Act was in place, was reviewed by the Joint Committee on Human 
Rights while it was still going through Parliament, and was later declared 
incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights.  The 
Anti-Terrorism Act is therefore an excellent case study of how the three 
British branches of government work together or against each other to 
create and change laws. 
 
1.   Government Structure 
 
Although the United States’ government structure partially comes 
from its historical ties to the United Kingdom, the two countries’ current 
government structures are remarkably different.  Instead of co-equal 
branches of government with a strong separation of powers and checks 
and balances, the British government branches are more integrated with 
no emphasis placed on having branches with equivalent powers or the 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss3/6
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ability to “check” each other.97  Instead, the British executive branch – 
the Prime Minister and his or her cabinet
98
 – dominates Parliament by 
introducing the majority of Bills for consideration by the legislature and 
ensuring that its bills are passed its through strong party control over the 
Commons.  Unlike in the United States, British Members of the House of 
Commons almost invariably vote along party lines which means that the 
Prime Minister, who, by definition is the leader of the party with the 
majority of seats in the House of Commons, is virtually guaranteed that 
his or her legislation will pass.
99
 
Moreover, domination of Parliament essentially means domination 
of the judiciary because the judiciary usually defers to Parliament under 
the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty.
100
  According to the doctrine 
of parliamentary sovereignty, Parliament in the United Kingdom is 
supreme and no other power can overrule it, including the judiciary.
101
  
Due to the importance of this doctrine, the British judiciary has 
traditionally deferred to Parliament when reviewing statutes.
102
 
Since the enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998, the branches of 
government in Britain have become more co-equal.  In order to help 
Parliament meet its obligations under the Human Rights Act, the Joint 
Committee on Human Rights was created.  The Joint Committee on 
Human Rights has the power to question the executive on the terms of a 
bill and even propose amendments to that bill that Parliament can use in 
its debates.
103
  Over time, this committee has become more powerful and 
 
97. MALCOLM WALLES, BRITISH AND AMERICAN SYSTEMS OF GOVERNMENT 78 
(1988). 
98. The Monarch is considered the symbolic head of the executive but he or she has 
no real power to block the actions of the Prime Minister. WALLES, supra note 97, at 78. 
99. WALLES, supra note 97, at 78; R. M. PUNNETT, BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND 
POLITICS 189 (5th ed. 1987). The House of Lords does not have strong party affiliations 
but it cannot block legislation, it can only delay it. David Williams, The Courts and 
Legislation: Anglo-American Contrasts, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 323, 333 (2001). 
100. PETER LEYLAND, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED KINGDOM: A CONTEXTUAL 
ANALYSIS 147 (2012). 
101. See generally A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE 
CONSTITUTION (1885). For an electronic version of this literature, visit 
http://www.constitution.org/cmt/avd/law_con.htm. 
102. See, e.g., R v. A, [2001] UKHL 25 [58] (Lord Hope) (“[I]t is appropriate in 
some circumstances for the judiciary to defer, on democratic grounds, to the considered 
opinion of the elected body as to where the balance is to be struck between the rights of 
the individual and the needs of society”). 
103. Janet L. Hiebert, Parliament and the Human Rights Act: Can the JCHR Help 
Facilitate a Culture of Rights?, 4 INT’L J. CONST. LAW 1, 18-19 (2006). 
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its well-written reports have become a tool for members of Parliament 
during debates,
104
 the judiciary
105
 and human rights advocates in the 
United Kingdom.
106
  These groups use the Joint Committee on Human 
Rights’ reports to put pressure on the executive to change its policies and 
legislation. 
In addition, the British judiciary has been less likely to defer to 
Parliament after the enactment of the Human Rights Act. The primary 
purpose of the Human Rights Act was to incorporate the rights contained 
in the European Convention on Human Rights into British law so that 
those rights may be enforceable by British courts. To fulfill this purpose, 
the Human Rights Act also gives new powers to the British judiciary so 
it may ensure that the rights of British citizens are protected. Under the 
Human Rights Act, the British judiciary can now creatively interpret 
statutes or issue a Declaration of Incompatibility if creatively interpreting 
a statute would mean effectively rewriting it.
107
 
Section 3 of the Human Rights Act empowers British courts to 
interpret all legislation to be compatible with the European Convention 
on Human Rights insofar as it is “possible” to do so.108 Interpretative 
techniques such as narrowing the applicability of the statute, “reading it 
down” so it applies more narrowly, or reading terms into a statute are 
now available to the judiciary even when the statute being interpreted is 
not ambiguous.
109
 This means that British judges can even alter the 
statute’s wording if doing so would make the statute compatible with the 
European Convention on Human Rights.
110
 
 
104. Janet L. Hiebert, Interpreting a Bill of Rights: The Importance of Legislative 
Rights Review, 35 BRITISH J. POL. SCI. 235, 251(2005). 
105. See, e.g., R. (Animal Defenders Int’l) v. Sec’y of State for Culture, Media & 
Sport, [2008] UKHL 15 [14-21] (Lord Bingham) (agreeing with the Joint Committee on 
Human Rights that the Communications Act 2003’s ban on all political advertising was 
incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights). 
106. See, e.g., LIBERTY, LIBERTY’S EVIDENCE TO THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS’ INQUIRY INTO THE GOVERNMENT’S JUSTICE AND SECURITY GREEN PAPER, Feb. 
2012, available at http://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/pdfs/policy12/liberty-s-
evidence-to-the-jchr-inquiry-into-the-government-s-justice-and-sec.pdf (last visited Apr. 
24, 2014). 
107. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, §§ 3 & 4 (U.K), available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/42/data.pdf. 
108. Id. § 3. 
109. Alison L. Young, Judicial Sovereignty and the Human Rights Act 1998, 61 
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 53, 62 (2002). 
110. David Bonner, et al., Judicial Approaches to the Human Rights Act, 52 INT’L 
& COMP. L.Q. 549, 556 (2003). It arguably even requires judges to do so. Lord Lester of 
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Under § 4 of the Human Rights Act, higher British courts can issue 
a Declaration of Incompatibility if they cannot interpret a statute 
creatively.
111
 This declaration has no legal effect – the litigant before the 
court has no immediate remedy – but a Declaration of Incompatibility 
does put political pressure on Parliament and the executive to remedy the 
incompatible legislation.
112
 The executive has responded to every 
Declaration of Incompatibility issued by the British courts, although 
perhaps not as fully or quickly as some would like.
113
  Laws that affect 
human rights can also bring the European Court of Human Rights into 
play, which, under the European Convention on Human Rights, has the 
power to rule that a British law is inconsistent with the European 
Convention on Human Rights.
114
  Such an incompatibility requires the 
United Kingdom, under its treaty obligations, to amend the offending 
law.
115
 
Despite these obstacles, due to its party control over Parliament and 
the judiciary’s continued deference to Parliament, the British executive 
has less reason to compromise or anticipate resistance from either the 
legislature or judiciary than its American counterpart.  This is 
particularly true for anti-terrorism legislation, for which the judiciary has 
historically deferred to the executive.
116
 
 
Herne Hill, The Art of the Possible - Interpreting Statutes Under the Human Rights Act, 
1998 EUR. H.R. L. REV 665, 669. 
111. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 4 (U.K). 
112. Unfortunately, this does nothing to help the litigant, who is still bound by the 
incompatible statute.  For this reason, two commentators have noted that it is actually 
better for the litigant if the court attempts to interpret the statute, which will have a 
positive effect on the litigant, than to issue a Declaration of Incompatibility.  Ian Leigh & 
Laurence Lustgarten, Making Rights Real: The Courts, Remedies, and the Human Rights 
Act, 58 CAMBRIDGE L. J. 509, 538 (1999) (“Issuance of a [Declaration of Incompatibility] 
means that, in practical terms, the plaintiff has lost.”). 
113. See, e.g., Liberty and JUSTICE Submission to the United Nations Human 
Rights Committee: Response to the United Kingdom’s Sixth Periodic Report Under the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [27] (the executive “waited until 
shortly before the annual deadline for renewal to force alternative measures through 
without sufficient time for the matter to be debated by Parliament”), available at 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/docs/ngos/liberty_justice_UK93.pdf (last 
accessed November 12, 2013). 
114. Alyssa King, A Supreme Court, Supreme Parliament, and Transnational 
National Rights, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 245, 246 (2010). 
115. JOINT COMM. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, SIXTEENTH REPORT OF SESSION 2006-07: 
MONITORING THE GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE TO COURT JUDGMENTS FINDING BREACHES OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS, HL 128, HC 728 at [46, 49] (U.K.). 
116. Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, Impact of Terrorism on the Rule of Law, 43 
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2.   History of Terrorist Attacks and Legislation 
 
In addition to government structure, the United Kingdom also 
differs from the United States because of its familiarity with terrorist 
attacks.  The terrorist violence in Northern Ireland reached a peak in the 
1960s and 1970s but even before then, the United Kingdom had dealt 
with terrorist attacks, guerrilla warfare, and insurgency in its colonies.
117
  
In 1922, the government of Northern Ireland authorized its police force 
to arrest without warrant and then indefinitely detain “any person whom 
he or she suspected of acting, or of having acted, or of being about to act, 
in a manner prejudicial to the preservation of the peace or maintenance 
of order.”118  These powers were upheld by the United Kingdom’s 
highest court.
119
  The violence of the Irish Republican Army (IRA), 
however, spurred the United Kingdom to re-introduce Internment (mass 
detentions in camps) in 1971 and withdraw Home Rule from Northern 
Ireland in 1972, which had allowed Northern Ireland to have an 
independent Parliament.
120
 
The first comprehensive pieces of anti-terrorism legislation were the 
Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Acts, which were passed as 
temporary measures from 1973 to 1978, against the backdrop of 
increased bombing in Northern Ireland by the IRA.
121
  One of these laws, 
the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act in 1974, 
permitted detention of suspects for questioning for up to seven days 
without trial or any other outside assessment.
122
  The Detention of 
 
INT’L LAW. 13, 13-14 (2009). 
117. Leandro Martínez-Peñas & Manuela Fernández-Rodríguez, Evolution of 
British Law on Terrorism: From Ulster to Global Terrorism (1970-2010), in POST 9/11 
AND THE STATE OF PERMANENT LEGAL EMERGENCY 201, 202 (Ancieto Masferrer ed., 
2012). 
118. Brice Dickson, The Detention of Suspected Terrorists in Northern Ireland and 
Great Britain, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 927, 931 (2009) (citing Civil Authorities (Special 
Powers) Acts (Northern Ireland), 1956 S.R. & O. No. 1956/191, 11(1) (N. Ir.)). 
119. Liversidge v. Anderson, [1942] A.C. 206, 213. 
120. Martínez-Peñas & Fernández-Rodríguez, supra note 117, at 203; Dickson, 
supra note 118, at 931. 
121. Clive Walker, Clamping Down on Terrorism in the United Kingdom, 4 J. INT’L 
CRIM. JUST. 1137, 1137-38 (2006).  Prior to these “troubles,” the United Kingdom was 
already familiar with terrorism in colonial conflicts in places like Palestine, Kenya, 
Malaysia, Cyprus and Aden. Id. at 1137. 
122. Fionnuala Ni Aolain, The Fortification of an Emergency Regime, 59 ALB. L. 
REV. 1353, 1361-62 (1996). 
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Terrorists (NI) Order 1972 allowed the Secretary of State for Northern 
Ireland to make an “interim custody order,” which permitted detention 
for twenty-eight days and, with the approval of an independent 
Commissioner, the prisoner could be subject to indefinite detention under 
a “detention order.”123 
The British police practices under Internment led to several cases 
before the European Court of Human Rights.
124
  Article 5 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights permits a deprivation of liberty, 
including detention, only under specific circumstances.  Among those is 
detention as part of criminal proceedings or “with a view to 
deportation.”125  Moreover, detention is lawful for immigration purposes 
as long as the deportation proceedings are diligently pursued and there 
are procedural safeguards in place to ensure that the decision to detain is 
not arbitrary.
126
  Generally speaking, the European Court of Human 
Rights will not make an independent inquiry into whether the detention 
is justified.
127
 
However, the interim custody orders were not justiciable under the 
European Convention on Human Rights because the United Kingdom 
had derogated from Article 5 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights due to its “public emergency.”128 Under Article 15 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, a state may derogate from 
certain Articles, including Article 5, if there is a “war or public 
emergency threatening the life of the nation” but the derogation may not 
go further than what is “strictly required by the exigencies of the 
situation” and the derogation may not be inconsistent with the state’s 
other international law obligations.
129
 
According to the European Court of Human Rights, a state of public 
 
123. Dickson, supra note 118, at 932 (citing Detention of Terrorists Order 
(Northern Ireland), 1972, SI 1972/1632 (N. Ir. 15), art. 4.). 
124. Diane Webber, Preventative Detention in the Law of Armed Conflict: 
Throwing Away the Key? 6 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 167, 171 (2012). 
125. Hakimi, supra note 6, at 618-20. 
126. Chahal v. United Kingdom, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 413, 465-66 (1996). 
127. Hakimi, supra note 6, at 619. 
128. Dickson, supra note 118, at 933. 
129. European Convention on Human Rights, Art. 15.  Article 15 allows Member 
States to derogate or partially revoke another Article of the European Convention on 
Human Rights in times of emergency if the derogation is publicly announced and 
communicated to the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe.  For a detailed analysis 
of the European Convention on Human Rights’ derogation requirements, see Hughes, 
supra note 6, at 4-6. 
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emergency refers to “an exceptional situation of crisis or emergency 
which affects the whole population and constitutes a threat to the 
organised life of the community of which the State is composed.”130  
Further, the emergency must be an actual emergency and not an 
emergency that is merely perceived by the state.
131
  When determining 
whether a measure taken under Article 15 is “strictly required by the 
exigencies of the situation,” the European Court of Human Rights looks 
to whether the measure is proportionate.
132
  The British Supreme Court
133
 
has analyzed proportionality with regard to Article 15 derogations using 
a three-part test: “whether: (i) the legislative objective is sufficiently 
important to justify limiting a fundamental right; (ii) the measures 
designed to meet the legislative objective are rationally connected to it; 
and (iii) the means used to impair the right or freedom are no more than 
is necessary to accomplish the objective.”134  The United Kingdom’s 
derogation was upheld during Internment.
135
 
The United Kingdom’s first permanent anti-terrorism statute was 
the Terrorism Act 2000, which was meant to permanently set the United 
Kingdom’s antiterrorism laws.136  A unique feature of the Terrorism Act 
2000 was that it provided a new definition of terrorism that included 
violent or seriously disruptive acts designed to threaten or influence the 
government “for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, racial or 
ideological cause.”137 Most controversially, this Act allowed police to 
search motor vehicles and people without being required to show 
reasonable suspicion.
138
  The European Court of Human Rights later 
declared this provision incompatible with Article 8 (right to privacy) of 
 
130. Lawless v. Ireland (No.3) 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 15, 31 (1979-80). 
131. Hughes, supra note 6, at 5. 
132. A v. Sec’y of State for Home Dep’t, [2005] 2 A.C. 68, 102-103. 
133. Until 2005, the highest court in the United Kingdom was called the House of 
Lords Appellate Division and it was housed in Parliament.  After the passage of the 
Constitutional Reform Act, the British Supreme Court received its new name and, in 
2010, its own building.  The Constitutional Reform Act, 2005, c. 4 (U.K.).  Members of 
the House of Lords in Parliament were also no longer allowed to serve as judges.  Id.  To 
avoid confusion, this Article will refer to the United Kingdom’s highest court as the 
British Supreme Court even for cases that were heard before 2005. 
134. Id. 
135. Hakimi, supra note 6, at 619. 
136. Dana Keith, In the Name of National Security or Insecurity?: The Potential 
Indefinite Detention of Noncitizen Certified Terrorists in the United States and United 
Kingdom in the Aftermath of September 11, 2011, 16 FLA. J. INT’L L. 405, 431 (2004). 
137. Terrorism Act, 2000, § 1 (U.K.). 
138. Id. § 44. 
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss3/6
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the European Convention on Human Rights.
139
  The Anti-Terrorism 
Act’s detention provisions were largely the same as previous temporary 
provisions, including a forty-eight hour detention period for those 
suspected of preparing or inciting terrorist acts.
140
 This Act was not in 
effect long due to the events of September 11, 2001, which caused the 
United Kingdom to engage in a massive overhaul of its antiterrorism 
legislation. 
 
3.   The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 
 
As with the PATRIOT Act, the Anti-terrorism Act was drafted in 
response to the attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 and 
was processed as an emergency measure.
141
  The Anti-terrorism Act 
contained several broad provisions that were meant to address terrorism, 
including the ability to seize assets, obtain confidential information from 
public bodies, and detain suspected terrorists.
142
  It was introduced into 
Parliament on October 12, 2001 and was signed into law approximately 
two months later on December 14, 2001.
143
  The Anti-terrorism Act went 
through Parliament rather quickly, but its passage was not smooth.  As in 
the United States, Opposition and Labour members of the House of 
Commons criticized the bill’s rushed timetable – three days to go 
through the Commons
144
 – which, they argued, did not give them enough 
time for a proper debate.
145
  Other critics of the Anti-terrorism bill argued 
that the executive used the threat of terror to pass intrusive legislation 
that had previously been rejected infringed on people’s rights.146 
 
139. Gillan v United Kingdom, 50 Eur. H.R. Rep. 45, [87] (2010). 
140. Terrorism Act, 2000, § 41 (U.K.). 
141. The bill had sixteen hours allotted in the House of Commons and only nine 
days in the House of Lords. HOME OFFICE, ANTI-TERRORISM, CRIME AND SECURITY BILL – 
PASSAGE THROUGH PARLIAMENT, Feb. 24, 2002; Dirk Haubrich, September 11, Anti-
Terror Laws and Civil Liberties: Britain, France and Germany Compared, 38 GOV’T & 
OPPOSITION 3, 8 (2003). 
142. Anti-terrorism, Crime & Security Act, 2001, c. 24-35 (U.K.). 
143. Id. c. 21-35.  The assent came the day after the bill had passed through the 
legislative process. 
144. Matthew Tempest, Lords Battle Looms over Anti-terror Bill, GUARDIAN 
(U.K.), Nov. 27, 2001, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/nov/27/september11.usa3. 
145. Michael Kallenbach, MPs in Revolt over Terrorism Bill, DAILY TELEGRAPH 
(U.K.), Nov. 23, 2001, available at 2001 WLNR 2790360. 
146. Benedict Brogan, Anti-terror Reforms Too Intrusive, Say Ministers, DAILY 
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4.   Amendments in Parliament 
 
Several members of the Labour Party defied the party whips and 
voted against certain measures of the Anti-Terrorism Act such as 
“powers that prevent the Home Secretary’s decisions being challenged 
by judicial review.”147  Opposition from the Commons caused the 
executive to add “sunset clauses” to the bill.148  Despite numerous other 
objections, the bill passed through the Commons rather easily – only 23 
members of the Labour party voted against it along with Conservatives 
and Liberal-democrats – but it met strong opposition in the House of 
Lords.
149
  One of the primary issues the Lords had with the bill was the 
government’s ability to detain terror suspects without trial.150  As 
expected, the House of Lords passed several amendments to the Anti-
terrorism bill, particularly in the areas of obtaining bank records and 
detaining suspects without judicial review.
151
 
Once back in the Commons, the executive again tried to rush the 
bill through – giving the Commons another three days to look over the 
amendments passed in the House of Lords.
152
  The executive was 
particularly keen to have the Anti-terrorism Act passed by the time the 
Prime Minister, Tony Blair, attended an EU summit in Belgium.
153
  To 
put pressure on Parliament, David Blunkett, the Home Secretary, warned 
that a terrorist attack could be imminent and criticized those delaying the 
Anti-terrorism bill, noting that they did not have the security and 
 
TELEGRAPH (U.K.), Nov. 24, 2001, available at 2001 WLNR 2752489. 
147. Nigel Morris, MPs Prepare for Final Attack on Terror Bill,  INDEPENDENT 
(U.K.), Nov. 26, 2001, available at 2001 WLNR 7357905. 
148. Tempest, supra note 144.  Sunset clauses are provisions in a statute or 
regulation that repeal all or portions of the law after a specific date, unless further 
legislative action is taken to extend them. 
149. Id. 
150. Marie Woolf and Ben Russell, PARLIAMENT: LORDS - Peers Threaten to 
Block Emergency Anti-terror Laws, INDEPENDENT (U.K.), Nov. 28, 2001, available at 
2001 WLNR 7381724. 
151. Ben Russell, PARLIAMENT & POLITICS: ANTI-TERROR BILL - Tory and 
Lib Dem Peers Defeat Government over Police Powers, INDEPENDENT (U.K.), Dec. 7, 
2001, available at 2001 WLNR 7410302. 
152. Julian Glover, Lib Dems and Tories Ambush Government on Terror Bill, 
GUARDIAN (U.K.), Dec. 5, 2001, 
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2001/dec/05/houseofcommons.uk . 
153. Id. 
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intelligence information he had.
154
  Despite these warnings, the Lords 
continued to water down the Anti-terrorism bill.
155
 
Back in the House of Commons, several of the Lords’ amendments, 
including judicial review for interned foreign terror suspects, were 
quickly overturned.
156
  Prime Minister Tony Blair’s statements to the 
Commons that the measures were essential to fight terrorism, and Home 
Secretary David Blunkett’s concessions (including increasing the powers 
of an immigration appeals commission), likely convinced Members of 
the Commons to reverse the Lords’ changes.157  The bill again went back 
to Lords who reinstated three of their former amendments.
158
  Blunkett 
made further concessions to the Lords, including changing the way 
appeals of detained terrorist suspects are handled, and both Houses 
finally passed the bill.
159
 
 
5.   The Anti-terrorism Act and Indefinite Detention 
 
Like the PATRIOT Act, the Anti-Terrorism Act gives the executive 
the power to hold non-citizens who are certified as “international 
terrorists” by the Secretary of State indefinitely without charge or trial.160  
This power is given when non-nationals who are certified as 
“international terrorists” are ordered to be removed from the United 
Kingdom but cannot be because of legal or practical considerations such 
as when the detainee would be subjected to torture in the only country to 
which he or she can be deported.
161
  The European Court of Human 
 
154. Andrew Grice, Blunkett Warns of Attack at Christmas, INDEPENDENT (U.K.), 
Dec. 8, 2001, available at 2001 WLNR 7383323. 
155. Michael Kallenbach, Lords Savage Labour over `Hurried' Laws Terrorism 
Bill, DAILY TELEGRAPH (U.K.), Dec. 11, 2001, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1364947/Yesterday-in-Parliament.html. 
156. Paul Waugh, PARLIAMENT & POLITICS: MPs Quash Series of Lords 
Changes to Terrorism Bill, INDEPENDENT (U.K.), Dec. 13, 2001, available at 2001 
WLNR 7192745. 
157. Id. 
158. Patrick Wintour, Ministers Shocked as Terror Bill Suffers Further Defeats in 
Lords, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Dec. 13, 2001, 
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2001/dec/14/uk.september11. 
159. John Deans, Blunkett U-Turns on Terror, DAILY MAIL (U.K.), Dec. 14, 2001, 
available at 2001 WLNR 2675966. 
160. Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, § 23(2) (U.K.). 
161. JOINT COMM. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, SECOND REPORT OF SESSION 2001-02: ANTI-
TERRORISM, CRIME AND SECURITY BILL, H.L. 37, H.C. 372 [19] (U.K.). 
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Rights has made it clear that such deportation would violate Article 3 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights.
162
 
Under the seminal case Soering v. United Kingdom, the European 
Court of Human Rights prohibited the United Kingdom from deporting 
Soering to the United States because he faced the death penalty there.
163
  
Although the European Court of Human Rights held that the death 
penalty itself would not necessarily violate Article 3 (prohibition of 
torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment), the 
circumstances of the capital punishment system in Virginia, where 
Soering would be sent, did implicate Article 3.
164
  More specifically, the 
European Court of Human Rights held that the amount of time spent on 
death row and the risk of rape or physical abuse combined with Soering’s 
young age and mental state when he committed the crime meant that his 
time on death row would be inhuman or degrading treatment.
165
  Further, 
the European Court of Human Rights held that Member States could be 
in violation of Article 3 if they extradite anyone to a country “where 
substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person 
concerned, if extradited, faces a real risk of being subjected to torture or 
to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the requesting 
country.”166  Accordingly, Soering prohibited the United Kingdom from 
deporting anyone to a country where it is likely they would be tortured or 
suffer inhuman treatment. 
The United Kingdom was therefore left with a quandary as to what 
to do with suspected terrorists who could be deported only to countries 
where they would be likely to be tortured.  The Anti-terrorism, Crime 
and Security Act allowed the Home Secretary to detain these suspected 
terrorists essentially indefinitely pending deportation because such 
deportation would not be allowed under Article 3.
167
  As noted above, 
this “solution” was one of many aspects of the Anti-terrorism Act that 
were criticized as it went through Parliament and after it was passed into 
law.  Moreover, both Parliament (in the form of the Joint Committee on 
 
162. Soering v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 439 (1989). Article 3 states: 
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.” 
163. Id. 
164. Id. at [111]. 
165. Id. The fact that Soering could also be extradited to Germany, where he was 
from, and would not be subject to capital punishment, was also relevant to the court. 
166. Id. at [91]. 
167. Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001 (U.K.). 
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Human Rights) and the courts (both British courts and the European 
Court of Human Rights) found the executive’s “solution” to also violate 
the European Convention on Human Rights as it had during Internment. 
 
6.   Joint Committee on Human Rights Concerns 
 
As the Anti-terrorism bill went through Parliament, the Joint 
Committee on Human Rights warned that the speed with which the Anti-
terrorism bill was traveling through Parliament was dangerous and would 
not allow Parliament to give such a complex bill proper scrutiny.
168
  The 
Joint Committee also questioned whether the bill was justified by the 
current international situation and noted that the bill could “fall foul of 
the European Convention on Human rights.”169  Even before the Anti-
Terrorism Act was introduced to Parliament, the Joint Committee on 
Human Rights voiced its concerns that the executive’s powers amounted 
to indefinite detention rather than detention pending removal, which was 
a clear violation of Article 5 (right to liberty and security of person) of 
the European Convention on Human Rights, as announced in the 
European Court of Human Rights case Chahal v United Kingdom.
170
  
Although Article 5 would allow detention for immigration purposes 
under Chahal, it would only do so if the detention was obviously 
intended to be temporary until deportation.
171
  The Anti-Terrorism Act 
contained no such contingency – it explicitly allowed indefinite detention 
if the suspected alien terrorist could not be deported.
172
  Based on this 
impending violation, the executive was forced to derogate from Article 5 
of the European Convention on Human Rights.
173
 
The Joint Committee on Human Rights explained the executive’s 
approach thusly: 
 
[the executive cannot] derogate from Article 3 without 
 
168. Ben Russell, Parliament & Politics: Human Rights - MPs Warn Against 
Rushing Through Anti-terror Bill, INDEPENDENT (U.K.), Nov. 17, 2001, available at 2001 
WLNR 7198482. 
169. Id. 
170. Chahal v. United Kingdom, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 413 (1996); JOINT COMM. ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 161, at [23]. 
171. JOINT COMM. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 161, at [19]. 
172. Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001 (U.K.). 
173. Human Rights Act, 1998 (Designated Derogation) Order, 2001, S.I. 2001 No. 
3641 (U.K.), available at http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/46e5564f2.pdf. 
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‘denouncing’ the Convention as a whole and then re-
entering with a reservation relating to Article 3. If it took 
this course, the Home Secretary [the British Secretary of 
State] would be able (under powers he already 
possesses) to deport foreign nationals without regard to 
their possible fate in the country to which they were 
returned. This the [executive] is not prepared to do. It 
has therefore adopted a different route, but one which 
still appears to necessitate derogation—but in this case 
the derogation is from Article 5, which is permissible 
under Article 15.
174
 
 
The executive submitted the derogation order on the same day the Anti-
Terrorism Act was introduced, which, according to the executive, 
allowed it to state that the Anti-Terrorism Act was compatible with the 
Human Rights Act.
175
  According to the executive, the derogation was 
the result of a “public emergency” resulting from the terrorist attacks on 
the United States on September 11, 2001.
176
 
In response to this derogation order, the Joint Committee on Human 
Rights’ main concern was that the executive’s ability to indefinitely 
detain persons with few legal safeguards or limitations on this power was 
not justified by the executive’s articulated “public emergency” – threats 
from Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups.
177
  The Joint Committee on 
Human Rights’ concerns were partially due to the executive’s refusal to 
provide the Joint Committee on Human Rights with any information to 
support its “public emergency” stance.  The Newton Committee, which 
was charged with reviewing the Anti-Terrorism Act by the Home 
Secretary, also advised revising the Anti-Terrorism Act so that 
derogation was not necessary.
178
 
The executive responded to some of the concerns of the Joint 
 
174. JOINT COMM. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 161, at [19]. 
175. JOINT COMM. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, FIFTH REPORT OF SESSION 2002-03: 
CONTINUANCE IN FORCE OF SECTIONS 21 TO 23 OF THE ANTI-TERRORISM, CRIME AND 
SECURITY ACT 2001, H.L. 59, H.C. 462, at App’x 2, Letter from David Blunkett to the 
Chairman of the Joint Committee on Human Rights (U.K.). 
176. Human Rights Act 1998 (Designated Derogation) Order 2001, supra note 173. 
177. JOINT COMM. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 161, at [30]. 
178. PRIVY COUNSELLOR REVIEW COMM., ANTI-TERRORISM, CRIME AND SECURITY 
ACT 2001 REVIEW: REPORT, Dec. 12, 2003 (last visited Oct. 20, 2013), available at 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2003/dec/atcsReport.pdf. 
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Committee on Human Rights but not others.
179
  The executive refused to 
amend the derogation order or change the provisions allowing for 
indefinite detention of non-nationals suspected of terrorism.
180
  The 
changes it did make favored stronger parliamentary review through 
“sunset clauses” but did little to improve judicial review.181  Accordingly, 
it appears that, due to the speed at which the Anti-Terrorism Act was 
pushed through Parliament, the scarcity of evidence that Parliament 
received, and the executive’s refusal to accept all of the Joint Committee 
on Human Rights’ recommendations, Parliament did not have much of 
an oversight role over the Anti-Terrorism Act before it became law.
182
 
After the Anti-Terrorism Act was passed, commentators were 
highly critical of the Anti-Terrorism Act.
183
  One of the first critics of the 
Anti-terrorism Act was Lord Woolf, the Lord Chief Justice of England 
and Wales.
184
  He argued that the Anti-terrorism Act would damage the 
United Kingdom’s reputation abroad and promised that the judges that 
were to hear aliens’ detention challenges would release them if the 
detention was not “based on proper evidence.”185  Days after the bill was 
passed, eight suspected terrorists were detained by immigration officers 
under the Home Secretary’s new powers.186  The media also noted the 
potential human rights violations inherent in the Anti-Terrorism Act’s 
indefinite detention provisions and the plans of public interest groups to 
litigate against it.
187
  The Joint Committee on Human Rights and the 
 
179. JOINT COMM. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, FIFTH REPORT OF SESSION 2001-02: ANTI-
TERRORISM, CRIME AND SECURITY BILL: FURTHER REPORT, H.L. 51, H.C. 420, at [8, 19] 
(U.K.). 
180. Id. 
181. Id. 
182. Stephen Tierney, Determining the State of Exception: What Role for 
Parliament and the Courts?, 68 MOD. L. REV. 668, 672 (2005). See also Janet L. Hiebert, 
Parliamentary Review of Terrorism Measures, 68 MOD. L. REV. 676, 676 (2005). 
183. Mark Elliot, United Kingdom: The “War on Terror,” U.K.-Style – The 
Detention and Deportation of Suspected Terrorists, 8 INT’L J. CONST. L. 131, 133 (2010). 
184. Joshua Rozenberg, Woolf Attacks New Terror Law, DAILY TELEGRAPH (U.K.), 
Dec. 17, 2001, available at 2001 WLNR 2793920. 
185. Id. 
186. Ian Burrell & Jason Bennetto, Blunkett Provokes Anger by Using New Terror 
Laws to Arrest Eight Suspects, INDEPENDENT (U.K.), Dec. 20, 2001, available at 2001 
WLNR 7069488 
187. Don Mackay, War on Terror: Fight for Peace: 8 Seized in “Terror” Swoop, 
MIRROR (U.K.), Dec. 20, 2001, available at 2001 WLNR 9450421; Paul Waugh, 
Campaign Against Terrorism: Terror Suspects to be Rounded Up Under New Law, 
INDEPENDENT (U.K.), Dec.15, 2001, available at 2001 WLNR 7361497; Burrell & 
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executive resumed discussions when the Anti-Terrorism Act was due for 
renewal, but no major changes were made to the legislation.
188
  Talks 
between the Joint Committee on Human Rights and the executive 
resumed again when litigation commenced against the Anti-Terrorism 
Act.  However, the executive refused to alter the legislation absent a 
judicial decision.
189
 
 
7.   The British Supreme Court Justices Issue a Declaration of 
Incompatibility 
 
In 2004, the British Supreme Court considered in A and Others 
whether the Anti-Terrorism Act was incompatible with the European 
Convention on Human Rights.
190
  A and Others was brought by a group 
of foreign nationals who had been certified by the Secretary of State as 
suspected international terrorists under § 21 of the Anti-terrorism Act.
191
  
The appellants could not be deported under Article 3 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights and they were being held without charge 
or trial under the United Kingdom’s derogation from Article 5.192  The 
appellants argued that their detention violated Article 5 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights and was discriminatory against non-
nationals in violation of Article 14 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights.
193
 
The Law Lords (as they were then called) first decided that the 
executive had proved that a state of emergency existed and that it was 
acceptable for the executive to derogate from Article 5 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights.  This decision was made with some 
“misgivings” or “hesitation” by some judges and was not unanimous.194  
 
Bennetto, supra note 186.  But see New Law Cannot Touch Briton Who Recruited for 
Taliban, DAILY MAIL (U.K.), Dec. 18, 2001, available at  2001 WLNR 2676486 
(lamenting that the Anti-Terrorism Act allows only foreign terrorism suspects to be 
“arrested without a trial.”). 
188. JOINT COMM. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, SIXTH REPORT OF SESSION 2003-04: ANTI-
TERRORISM, CRIME AND SECURITY ACT 2001: STATUTORY REVIEW AND CONTINUANCE OF 
PART 4, HL 38, HC 381 (U.K.). 
189. JOINT COMM. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 175, at [36]. 
190. A v. Sec’y of State for Home Dep’t, [2004] UKHL 56. 
191. Id. 
192. Id. 
193. Id. 
194. Id. at  [26] (Lord Bingham); [78] (Lord Nicholls); [97] (Lord Hoffman); [165] 
(Lord Rodger). 
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As to whether the Anti-Terrorism Act violated other Articles in the 
European Convention on Human Rights, such as Article 14’s prohibition 
on discrimination, the executive argued that the judiciary should defer to 
Parliament because Parliament should be the branch that determines 
what response to terrorism is appropriate.
195
 
Previously, the Law Lords might have accepted this argument and 
deferred to Parliament.  Instead, this argument gave Lord Bingham great 
pause and caused him to draw on a diverse group of sources, including a 
United States Supreme Court decision, to examine the appropriate roles 
for courts and the legislature.
196
  Lord Bingham ultimately decided that it 
was entirely appropriate for the Lords to review the compatibility of the 
Anti-Terrorism Act, and rejected the Attorney General’s attempt to 
“stigmatise judicial decision-making as in some way undemocratic.”197  
The judiciary, Lord Bingham, insisted, was acting within its democratic 
mandate from Parliament.
198
 
The majority of Lords ultimately found that the Anti-Terrorism 
Act’s response to the threat of terrorism (in particular the ability to 
indefinitely detain suspected non-nationals) was disproportionate and 
discriminatory,
199
 and, therefore in violation of the European Convention 
on Human Rights.
200
  In doing so, they were heavily influenced by the 
Newton Committee report and the comments of the European 
Commissioner for Human Rights in his Opinion 1/2002 (28 August 
2002).
201
  The Supreme Court justices also referred to the Joint 
Committee on Human Rights’ reports throughout their discussion of the 
issues.
202
  As a result of its findings, the Supreme Court issued a 
Declaration of Incompatibility,
203
 which left the executive and 
Parliament to remedy the Anti-terrorism Act. 
The executive responded to A and Others with outrage to the press, 
 
195. Id. at  [37] (Lord Bingham). 
196. Id. at  [39] (Lord Bingham). 
197. Id. at  [42] (Lord Bingham). 
198. Id. at  [42] (Lord Bingham). 
199. The Anti-Terrorism Act was found to be discriminatory because it made an 
impermissible distinction between nationals and non-nationals. Only non-nationals were 
subjected to indefinite detention. A  v. Sec’y of State for Home Dep’t, [2004] UKHL 56. 
200. Id. at [43] (Lord Bingham); [84] (Lord Nicholls); [133, 138] (Lord Hope); 
[159] (Lord Scott); [189] (Lord Rodger); [231] (Baroness Hale). 
201. Id. at [34], [43] (Lord Bingham). 
202. Id. at [65] (Lord Bingham). 
203. Id. at [73] (Lord Bingham). 
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calling the decision “simply wrong.” 204  Incoming Home Secretary 
Charles Clarke also promised that “the detainees will all remain in prison 
indefinitely regardless of the ruling.”205  The press was surprisingly not 
antagonistic to A and Others, calling the Anti-Terrorism Act 
“draconian”206 and “misconceived.”207  Even some of the British tabloids, 
which are typically very conservative, presented both sides of the 
issue.
208
  The substantial and mainly positive press that the Supreme 
Court justices’ ruling received, as well as the subsequent resignations of 
the appointed detainees’ barristers, was probably instrumental in the 
executive’s decision to change its antiterrorism legislation.209 
 
8.   The Prevention of the Terrorism Act 
 
The executive had until March 2005 to decide whether to renew the 
indefinite detention provisions in the Anti-terrorism Act or attempt to 
revise the legislation in response to the Declaration of Incompatibility 
issued by Supreme Court in A and Others and it had until March 2006 
before the Anti-terrorism Act’s “sunset clause” caused that provision to 
lapse completely.
210
  Although the new Home Secretary, Charles Clarke, 
 
204. Neil Mackay, Home Secretary Charles Clarke is Already Embroiled in a 
Battle Between Law Lords and the Government. At Stake is British Democracy, SUNDAY 
HERALD (U.K.), Dec. 19, 2004, at 13, available at 2004 WLNR 14422492. 
205. Id.; Stephen Howard, No Freedom For Detainees; Government Defies Law 
Lords' Ruling, DAILY POST (U.K.), Dec. 17, 2004. 
206. Mackay, supra note 204.  See also Martin Bright, Is a Pair of Boots All that 
Stand Between 11 Untried Detainees and Their Liberty?, OBSERVER (U.K.), Dec. 19, 
2004, available at 2004 WLNR 23621486 (describing the Government’s flimsy 
evidence). 
207. Leading Article: The Law Lords Have Made an Admirable Defence of Our 
Fundamental Freedoms, INDEPENDENT (U.K.), Dec. 17, 2004, available at 2004 WLNR 
14254400; see also Bright, supra note 206. 
208. Ben Taylor, Crisis as Lords Say Anti-terror Laws are Illegal, DAILY MAIL 
(U.K.), Dec. 17, 2004, available at 2004 WLNR 14286992. But see The Government's 
First Duty is to Keep Us Safe, DAILY TELEGRAPH (U.K.), Dec. 17, 2004, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/telegraph-view/3613615/The-Governments-first-
duty-is-to-keep-us-safe.html (blaming the problem on the European Convention on 
Human Rights and the “Europeanisation” of the British legal system). 
209. Clare Dyer, Government Prepares to Unveil Changes to Anti terror Laws, 
GUARDIAN (U.K.), Jan. 17, 2005; Jason Bennetto & Ben Russell, Reform of Terror Laws 
on Labour Agenda, INDEPENDENT (U.K.), Dec. 21, 2004, available at 2004 WLNR 
14473597. 
210. Patrick Wintour & Alan Travis, Blair Faces Dilemma on Law and Order, 
GUARDIAN (U.K.), Dec. 17, 2004, available at 2004 WLNR 23592011. 
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originally stated that he would attempt to renew the provisions of the 
Anti-terrorism Act,
211
 the executive instead introduced the Prevention of 
Terrorism Bill in the House of Commons on February 22, 2005. 
Instead of indefinite detention, the Prevention of Terrorism Bill 
gave the Secretary of State power to place an individual under house 
arrest or place such other restrictions on his or her movements.
212
  These 
restrictions included prohibiting telephone usage and limiting how long 
the person could be outside of his or her dwelling.
 213
  The executive 
called these powers “derogating control orders.”214  In order to obtain a 
control order, the Secretary of State was required to apply to the High 
Court of England and Wales and show that he or she had reasonable 
grounds for suspecting the controlee is or has been involved in terrorism-
related activity, and that the control order was necessary to protect the 
public from a risk of terrorism.
215
 
The court was required to permit the control order unless the 
Secretary of State’s decision is “obviously flawed” and it can do so in the 
absence of the controlee.
216
  Once the control order was issued, the 
controlee was entitled to a hearing but the controlee and his or her 
attorney could be excluded from the hearing to ensure that no 
information was revealed to the controlee that is contrary to the public 
interest as long as the controlee’s special advocate was provided that 
information.
217
  If the court found that the Secretary of State’s control 
order was not “flawed,” the control order would remain in place.218 
 
9.   Parliament’s Response 
 
The Prevention of Terrorism Bill went through Parliament in a little 
over two weeks so it would be in place before the (human rights 
incompatible) detention regime of the Anti-Terrorism Act expired.  The 
Prevention of Terrorism Bill was debated in the Commons the day after 
 
211. Id. 
212. Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2005, § 1 (U.K.). 
213. Id.; Clive Walker, Keeping Control of Terrorists Without Losing Control of 
Constitutionalism, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1395, 1412 (2007). 
214. John Ip, Comparative Perspectives on the Detention of Terrorist Suspects, 16 
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 773, 799 (2007). 
215. Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2005, §§ 2(1), 3(1)(a), 15(1)(c) (U.K.). 
216. Id. §§ 3(2)(b), 3(5). 
217. United Kingdom Civil Procedure Rules 76.22(1), 76.23, 76.28(1). 
218. Prevention of Terrorism Act,2005,  § 3(13) (U.K.). 
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it was introduced and the Joint Committee on Human Rights’ report 
came three days after its introduction to the Commons, in time for the 
Common’s standing committee to debate it.219  The Joint Committee on 
Human Rights welcomed the executive’s acceptance of the Law Lords’ 
ruling in A and Others, its decision to no longer derogate from Article 5 
of the European Convention on Human Rights, and its decision to move 
away from indefinite detention to more flexible control orders.
220
  
However, it also questioned the necessity of control orders and the lack 
of judicial involvement before those orders were issued.
221
  The 
Commons debates likewise focused on judicial involvement in the 
issuance and review of control orders.
222
  Despite these debates and the 
Joint Committee on Human Rights’ concerns, the Prevention of 
Terrorism Bill quickly passed through the Commons and went to the 
Lords unamended. 
The executive tabled amendments to the Prevention of Terrorism 
Bill while it was being considered by the Lords and the Joint Committee 
on Human Rights published a report on those amendments two days 
later.
223
  As with the Anti-Terrorism Act, the amendments partially 
addressed some of the Joint Committee on Human Rights’ concerns.  
Specifically, the executive allowed increased (but still limited) judicial 
review of control orders.
224
  Although the speed of the Prevention of 
Terrorism Bill’s passage made it impossible for the Joint Committee on 
Human Rights to fully scrutinize these amendments, the Joint Committee 
on Human Rights still found fault with the amended bill and urged the 
executive to allow for greater judicial supervision.
225
  These pleas went 
unheard and the Prevention of Terrorism Bill was not amended again.  
The executive refused to change its current approach absent a ruling 
 
219. JOINT COMM. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, NINTH REPORT OF SESSION 2004-05: 
PREVENTION OF TERRORISM BILL: PRELIMINARY REPORT, H.L. 61, H.C. 389 (U.K.). 
220. Id. at [3]. 
221. Id. at [5-13]. 
222. See, e.g., 431 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.)10 1762 (U.K.) (Mr. Clarke). 
223. JOINT COMM. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, TENTH REPORT OF SESSION 2004-05: 
PREVENTION OF TERRORISM BILL, H.L. 68, H.C. 334 (U.K.). 
224. Id. 
225. JOINT COMM. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, FOURTEENTH REPORT OF SESSION 2006-07: 
GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE COMMITTEE'S EIGHTH REPORT OF THIS SESSION: 
COUNTER-TERRORISM POLICY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: DRAFT PREVENTION OF TERRORISM 
ACT 2005 (CONTINUANCE IN FORCE OF SECTIONS 1 TO 9 ORDER 2007), HL 106, HC 539 
(U.K.). 
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from the Supreme Court.
226
  The Prevention of Terrorism Bill became 
law on March 11, 2005. 
Despite the Joint Committee on Human Rights’ continuing concerns 
about existing control orders, when the control order provisions of the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act came up for renewal in February 2006, the 
executive decided to renew them without amendment.
227
  The executive 
stated that it intended to review the orders again a year later, after the 
executive had received a report by Lord Carlisle, who had been 
appointed by the Home Secretary to review the Prevention of Terrorism 
Act.
228
  The executive also wanted to wait until after the resolution of 
existing cases against the Prevention of Terrorism Act.
229
 
 
10.  The British Supreme Court’s Rulings 
 
As noted by the Joint Committee on Human Rights, the Prevention 
of Terrorism Act’s control orders raised the same Article 5 concerns as 
indefinite detention.
230
 Litigation soon followed its enactment and the 
executive took notice of lower court activity that resulted from the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act.  For example, the executive lowered the 
maximum number of curfew hours in some cases after the Court of 
Appeal held that some of the control orders’ curfew requirements were 
so restrictive that they amounted to a violation of liberty under Article 
5.
231
  However, no major actions were to be taken until the Supreme 
Court had ruled on the issue.  The executive noted in its July 2007 
Consultation Paper that it did not want to pre-empt any forthcoming 
Supreme Court judgments and would consider “whether any further 
changes to the control order system are necessary in light of” these 
 
226. Id. 
227. JOINT COMM. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, TWELFTH REPORT OF SESSION 2005-06: 
COUNTER-TERRORISM POLICY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: DRAFT PREVENTION OF TERRORISM 
ACT 2005 (CONTINUANCE IN FORCE OF SECTIONS 1 TO 9) ORDER 2006, H.L. 122, H.C. 915 
(U.K.). 
228. Id. 
229. Id. 
230. Id. 
231. JOINT COMM. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, TENTH REPORT OF SESSION 2007-08: 
COUNTER–TERRORISM POLICY AND HUMAN RIGHTS (NINTH REPORT): ANNUAL RENEWAL 
OF CONTROL ORDERS LEGISLATION 2008, H.L. 57, H.C. 356, Letter from Home Secretary 
dated Feb. 18, 2008, at App’x 2 (U.K.). 
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judgments.
232
 
Subsequently, on October 31, 2007, the Supreme Court gave 
judgments in three cases concerning significant aspects of the control 
orders regime, upon which the Joint Committee on Human Rights had 
previously reported.  The case of JJ concerned the point at which the 
obligations in a control order become so restrictive that they amount to a 
deprivation of liberty; MB concerned whether the procedures in control 
order cases were compatible with the right of the controlled person to 
due process; and E concerned the extent of the executive’s duties under 
the Prevention of Terrorism Act to keep the possibility of criminal 
prosecution under review.
233
 
In JJ, the Supreme Court ruled by a majority of three to two that the 
six control orders at issue, which had curfews of 18 hours per day, 
deprived the plaintiffs of their liberty, and therefore breached Article 5 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights.
234
  The control orders were 
therefore quashed.  However, due to the nature of British judicial 
decisions – each judge writes a separate opinion even if they agree with 
each other – the majority of judges had different views on why the 
control orders were incompatible with the European Convention on 
Human Rights. 
Speaking as part of the majority, Lord Bingham believed that, 
although not technically prison: 
 
[t]he effect of the 18-hour curfew, coupled with the 
effective exclusion of social visitors, meant that the 
controlled persons were in practice in solitary 
confinement for this lengthy period every day for an 
indefinite duration, with very little opportunity for 
contact with the outside world, with means insufficient 
to permit provision of significant facilities for self-
entertainment and with knowledge that their flats were 
 
232. HOME OFFICE, POSSIBLE MEASURES FOR INCLUSION IN A COUNTER TERRORISM 
BILL, July 25, 2007, at [58], http://www.statewatch.org/news/2007/jul/uk-ct-bill-
consultation.pdf. 
233. Sec’y of State for Home Dep’t v. JJ, [2007] UKHL 45; Sec’y of State for 
Home Dep’t v. MB, [2007] UKHL 46; Sec’y of State for Home Dep’t v. E, [2007] 
UKHL 47. 
234. Sec’y of State for Home Dep’t v. JJ, [2007] UKHL 45, [24] (Lord Bingham), 
[63] (Baroness Hale) and [105] (Lord Brown). 
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liable to be entered and searched at any time.
235
 
 
Lord Bingham compared this isolation and the fact that the Home 
Secretary “wholly regulated” their lives, made their living conditions 
similar to that of prisoners, except breaches of control orders were 
subject to more severe punishment than infractions made by traditional 
prisoners.
236
  Baroness Hale agreed that the control orders amounted to a 
deprivation of liberty and refused to speculate as to what length of 
curfew would not mean a deprivation of liberty.
237
 
The final member of the majority, Lord Brown, stated that the 
existing control orders violated Article 5 but he also indicated that 
control orders that had curfews of up to sixteen hours per day would not, 
in his opinion, amount to a deprivation of liberty.
238
  The other two 
judges, Lords Hoffman and Carswell, believed that the control orders did 
not amount to a deprivation of liberty.
239
  Lord Brown’s statement led the 
executive to construe JJ and Others as holding that curfews of up to 16 
hours did not violate the European Convention on Human Rights. The 
Secretary of State consequently raised curfews in four cases to 16 
hours.
240
 
Unsurprisingly, the Joint Committee on Human Rights disapproved 
of the Home Secretary’s reading of JJ and made several 
recommendations to amend the Prevention of Terrorism Act in light of 
that judgment.
241
  Specifically, the Joint Committee on Human Rights 
recommended a twelve hour limit on curfew hours and noted that, 
depending on the other restrictions placed on an individual, in some 
instances, curfews of twelve hours could still be found to violate the right 
to liberty.
242
  The Joint Committee on Human Rights warned that the 
European Court of Human Rights would surely rule on the issue in time 
and called for Parliament to give better guidance as to what it considered 
to be the appropriate limits on control orders so that individuals’ liberty 
 
235. Id. at  [24] (Lord Bingham). 
236. Id. 
237. Id. at [63] (Baroness Hale). 
238. Id. at [105] and [108]. 
239. Id. at [54, 84]. 
240. JOINT COMM. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, NINTH REPORT OF SESSION 2007-08: 
COUNTER-TERRORISM POLICY AND HUMAN RIGHTS (EIGHTH REPORT): COUNTER-
TERRORISM BILL, HL 50, HC 199, at [55-73] (U.K.). 
241. Id. 
242. Id. 
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would be respected.
243
 
In the second case considered by the Supreme Court, MB, the 
Secretary of State applied to the court for permission to make a non-
derogating control order to prevent MB, a British citizen, from travelling 
to Iraq to fight against the United Kingdom.
244
  The application was 
made without notice to MB and was supported by an open and a closed 
statement; MB never received notice of the application and, after it was 
granted, was never told what the closed statement said about him.
245
  MB 
argued that he was not given a fair hearing as required by Article 6 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights.
246
  The second plaintiff, AF, 
was also placed under a non-derogating control order, which restricted 
his visitors and even which mosque he could attend, and he was not 
given the closed material that formed the basis of his control order.
247
  
AF argued that his rights under Article 5 (deprivation of liberty) and 
Article 6 (right to a fair trial) had been violated.
248
 
The Supreme Court held by a majority of four to one that the 
procedures contained in the Prevention of Terrorism Act (and the Rules 
of Court made under it) would not be compatible with Article 6’s right to 
a fair hearing to the extent that they could lead to the upholding of a 
control order where the state never disclosed the essence of the case 
against the controlled person.
249
 The Supreme Court refused to issue a 
Declaration of Incompatibility as it did when reviewing the Anti-
Terrorism Act, but it did use Section 3 of the Human Rights Act to read 
additional words into the legislation guaranteeing the right of the 
controlled person to a fair hearing.
250
 
This judgment was subsequently interpreted by Lord Carlile as 
rejecting the compatibility challenge. Lord Carlile also stated that the 
state of the law post-MB was uncertain and asserted that that uncertainty 
would “ensure the most careful consideration” of each case by the 
executive.
251
  The Joint Committee on Human Rights was not satisfied 
 
243. Id. 
244. Sec’y of State for Home Dep’t v. MB, [2007] UKHL 46. 
245. Id. 
246. Id. 
247. Id. 
248. Id. 
249. Id. 
250. Id. 
251. Lord Carlile of Berriew Q.C., Third Report of the Independent Reviewer 
Pursuant to Section 14(3) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 [61], Feb. 18,  2008 
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with this assurance and advocated the adoption of its prior 
recommendations for improving the fairness of the special advocate 
regime such as allowing the controlled person greater access to the 
information being used as the basis of the control order and greater 
access to the special advocate that was to serve as his or her attorney.
 252
  
The executive responded that the additional language inserted into the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act by the Supreme Court effectively ensured 
that the Act complied with the European Convention on Human 
Rights.
253
 
In E, the final Prevention of Terrorism Act case considered by the 
Supreme Court, the Supreme Court held that it was the Secretary of 
State’s duty to continue to review the possibility of prosecuting 
controlled persons so that individuals would not remain under control 
orders indefinitely.
254
  E was subjected to a non-derogating control order 
and in 2005, the Secretary of State learned of two criminal judgments in 
Belgium implicating E in terrorist activities.
255
 However, the Secretary of 
State did not disclose this information to E or to the chief officer of the 
relevant police force.
256
  Instead, the Secretary of State continued to 
renew the control order, despite the police chief informing the Secretary 
of State under the requirements of the Prevention of Terrorism Act that 
the police chief did not believe there was sufficient evidence to continue 
to keep E under a control order.  E sued under Article 5 for deprivation 
of liberty.
 257
 
According to the Supreme Court, “prosecution should be the 
preferred course” and would be better for both society and the accused 
individual.
258
  In his report, Lord Carlile welcomed the idea of increased 
prosecutions.
259
  In response to these comments, the Joint Committee on 
Human Rights noted that “no individual who has been made the subject 
 
(U.K.). 
252. JOINT COMM. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 240, at 55-73. 
253. JOINT COMM. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, TWENTIETH REPORT OF SESSION 2007-08: 
COUNTER-TERRORISM POLICY AND HUMAN RIGHTS (TENTH REPORT): COUNTER-
TERRORISM BILL, H.L. 108, H.C. 554, at 91 (U.K.). 
254. Sec’y of State for Home Dep’t v. E, [2007] UKHL 47, [26] (appeal taken from 
Eng.). 
255. Id. at 6. 
256. Id. 
257. Id. 
258. Id. 
259. Lord Carlile of Berriew Q.C., supra note 251, at 4, 74. 
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of a control order has subsequently been prosecuted for a terrorism 
offense, other than for breach of a control order” and recommended that 
an amendment imposing an express duty on the Secretary of State to 
review individuals under control orders every three months. 
260
The 
executive did not take that advice and instead construed E as clarifying 
the Secretary of State’s duties and stated that it believed that it need not 
make any legislative amendment in response.
261
 
 
11.  The Counter Terrorism Act 
 
After these Supreme Court judgments, the executive published the 
Counter-Terrorism Bill on January 24, 2008.  The Counter-Terrorism 
Bill, although containing numerous amendments, did not address any of 
the Supreme Court decisions and gave even more expansive powers to 
the executive.  Most controversially, the executive wanted to raise the 
amount of time a person could be held in custody without being charged 
with a crime from twenty-eight days to forty-two days.
262
  In response to 
the Counter-Terrorism Bill, the Joint Committee on Human Rights issued 
numerous reports recommending amendments to fully address the 
Supreme Court’ decisions and better protect human rights.263  The Joint 
Committee on Human Rights seemed surprised that the executive had not 
already addressed its concerns, especially since the Supreme Court had 
expressed similar concerns and had even quashed some control orders in 
JJ and used § 3 of the Human Rights Act to read words into the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act in MB.
264
 
Lord Carlile published his third annual review of the control orders 
on February 18, 2008, three days before the renewal order was due to be 
debated in the House of Commons.
265
  His conclusions were the same as 
 
260. JOINT COMM. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 231, at 65, 72. 
261. JOINT COMM. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 253, at 72. 
262. JOINT COMM. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, TWENTY-FIRST REPORT OF SESSION 2007-08: 
COUNTER-TERRORISM POLICY AND HUMAN RIGHTS (ELEVENTH REPORT): 42 DAYS AND 
PUBLIC EMERGENCIES, H.L. 116, H.C. 635 (U.K.). 
263. JOINT COMM. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 253; JOINT COMM. ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS, supra note 240, at 40; JOINT COMM. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 231, at 5-14; 
JOINT COMM. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, TWENTY-FIFTH REPORT OF SESSION 2007-08: COUNTER-
TERRORISM POLICY AND HUMAN RIGHTS (TWELFTH REPORT): ANNUAL RENEWAL OF 28 
DAYS 2008, H.L. 132, H.C. 825, at 12-17, 21-62 (U.K.). 
264. JOINT COMM. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 231, at [37, 53]. 
265. Lord Carlile of Berriew Q.C., supra note 251, at [76]. 
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those in his second review.
266
  Namely, that “as a last resort (only), the 
control order system as operated currently in its non-derogating form is a 
justifiable and proportional safety valve for the proper protection of civil 
society.”267  The executive used this report to urge Parliament to renew 
the legislation and praised the Prevention of Terrorism Act as “strik[ing] 
the right balance between safeguarding society and safeguarding the 
rights of the individual.”268  The executive also stated that the Supreme 
Court’s  “judgments on control orders upheld the control orders regime. 
As such, Parliament should recognize the importance of control orders 
and support the legislation’s renewal for a further year.”269 
The Joint Committee on Human Rights argued, however, that 
Carlile’s third report did differ from the previous reports in that, in the 
third report, Lord Carlile believed that control orders should not last 
more than two years except in very exceptional circumstances.
270
  The 
executive made no mention of this finding in its press release.
271
  The 
executive refused to accept any of the Joint Committee on Human 
Rights’ amendments at first and, despite public pressure and defection 
amongst Labor members of the House of Commons regarding the forty-
two days detention power, the Counter-Terrorism Bill passed the 
Commons and went to the Lords.  In the Lords, it was subject to 
substantial debate and criticism with the result that the Lords voted 
overwhelmingly (309 votes to 118) to amend the bill to remove the forty-
two days provision.
272
  In response, the executive decided to drop the 
forty-two days power, which was the primary point of contention.
273
  The 
remaining provisions remained but the executive agreed to look at a few 
of the issues the Joint Committee on Human Rights had raised, including 
those relating to control orders.
274
  The Counter-Terrorism Act was 
signed into law on November 26, 2008. 
 
266. Id. 
267. Id. 
268. HOME OFFICE, LORD CARLILE REPORT: CONTROL ORDERS ARE "JUSTIFIABLE 
AND PROPORTIONAL", Feb. 18, 2008 (U.K.). 
269. Id. 
270. Lord Carlile of Berriew Q.C., supra note 251, at [50-51]. 
271. HOME OFFICE, supra note 268. 
272. 704 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (2007-08) 542-43 (U.K.). 
273. Sam Coates, House of Lords Deals Fatal Blow to 42-day Terror Detention 
Plans, TIMES (U.K.), Oct. 14, 2008. 
274. JOINT COMM. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, SECOND REPORT OF SESSION 2008-09: THE 
WORK OF THE COMMITTEE IN 2007-08, H.L. 10, H.C. 92, at App’x Annex 3 (U.K.). 
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12. Post Counter-Terrorism Act - Renewal of Control Orders and a   
New Government 
 
Since the Counter-Terrorism Act was passed, existing control orders 
have had to be renewed several times, which has caused the Joint 
Committee on Human Rights to repeatedly report on the human rights 
implications of the control orders.
275
  In these reports, the Joint 
Committee on Human Rights has asked for further changes to be made 
such as requiring greater parliamentary oversight of control orders and 
requiring the Secretary of State to report more substantially on existing 
control orders.
276
 
One source of authority the Joint Committee on Human Rights has 
repeatedly cited is the European Court of Human Rights, which held that 
the indefinite detention permitted under the Anti-Terrorism Act violated 
Article 5.
277
  In addition to Joint Committee on Human Rights reports on 
the Anti-Terrorism Act, the European Court of Human Rights also 
deferred to the Supreme Court’s decision that measures taken under the 
Anti-Terrorism Act were not necessary to combat the United Kingdom’s 
terrorism “emergency” and held that the derogation from Article 5 was 
disproportionate.
278
  The European Court of Human Rights agreed with 
the Joint Committee on Human Rights that that the Anti-Terrorism Act 
was incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights 
because detainees were not given the evidence that was being used to 
detain them.
279
 
Despite these criticisms, the United Kingdom’s anti-terrorism 
 
275. JOINT COMM. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 227, at [37, 53]; JOINT COMM. ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS, EIGHTH REPORT OF SESSION 2006-07: COUNTER-TERRORISM POLICY AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS: DRAFT PREVENTION OF TERRORISM ACT 2005 (CONTINUANCE IN FORCE 
OF SECTIONS 1 TO 9) ORDER 2007, H.L. 60, H.C. 365 at 63 (U.K.). 
276. JOINT COMM. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 227, at [37, 53]; see also A v. 
United Kingdom, 49 Eur. H.R. Rep. 29, [171] (2009). 
277. JOINT COMM. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 227, at [37, 53]. 
278. Id. at 190.  One scholar has called the European Court of Human Rights’ 
reliance on the British Supreme Court “parasitic.”  Elliot, supra note 183, at 136. 
279. JOINT COMM. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, NINTH REPORT OF SESSION 2009-10: 
COUNTER–TERRORISM POLICY AND HUMAN RIGHTS (SIXTEENTH REPORT): ANNUAL 
RENEWAL OF CONTROL ORDERS LEGISLATION 2010, H.L. 64, H.C. 395 (U.K.); A v. 
United Kingdom, 49 Eur. H.R. Rep. 29 [223-24] (2009).  Because it can take the 
European Court of Human Rights up to five years to hear a case, the European Court of 
Human Rights did not review the Anti-Terrorism Act until 2009. 
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legislation did not substantially change until the political composition of 
the legislature and executive changed.  When the Liberal-Democrats and 
the Conservatives formed a Coalition Government in 2010, they put forth 
a “Programme for Government” that promised to “introduce safeguards 
against the misuse of anti-terrorism legislation.”280 As a result of that 
promise, the Coalition Government published a Review of Counter-
Terrorism and Security Powers on January 26, 2011.  That report 
concluded that the Prevention of Terrorism Act should be repealed, and 
control orders should be replaced by increased surveillance of terrorism 
suspects and a less intrusive and more focused system: Terrorism 
Prevention and Investigation Measures (“TPIMs”).281 
TPIMs require suspected terrorists to sleep at night in an agreed 
upon location but allow them to move freely during the day and use the 
internet and cellular phones.
282
  In sharp contrast to the Labour 
Government’s efforts, the Coalition Government also reduced the 
amount of days of pre-charge detention from twenty-eight to fourteen.
283
  
When making those changes, the executive clearly took the European 
Court of Human Rights’ holding in A v. United Kingdom into account.  
The Coalition Government’s report is rife with references to the 
European Court of Human Rights and concerns that existing anti-
terrorism legislation violated the European Convention on Human 
Rights, which shows the continuing influence of the European Court of 
Human Rights.
284
  The Joint Committee on Human Rights welcomed 
these changes and urged the executive to suspend control orders until 
TPIMs were in place, which the executive refused to do.
285
  It is unclear 
what form the United Kingdom’s anti-terrorism legislation will take next. 
 
 
280. CABINET OFFICE, THE COALITION: OUR PROGRAMME FOR GOVERNMENT 11 
(2010) (U.K.). 
281. HOME OFFICE, REVIEW OF COUNTER-TERRORISM AND SECURITY POWERS: 
REVIEW FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, Cm 8004 at 7 (2011) (U.K.). 
282. Duncan Gardham, Terrorist Suspects Allowed to Move Freely, DAILY 
TELEGRAPH (U.K.), Jan. 27, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 1633285. 
283. HOME OFFICE, supra note 281, at 6. 
284. Id. at 10, 11, 17, 20, 31, 35, 41, 43, 45. 
285. JOINT COMM. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, EIGHTH REPORT OF SESSION 2010-11:  
RENEWAL OF CONTROL ORDERS LEGISLATION 2011, H.L. 106, H.C. 838 (U.K.).  The 
Government may have been bolstered by Lord Carlile’s Sixth Report, which found that, 
despite political controversy, control orders were working “reasonably well.” Lord 
Carlile of Berriew QC, Sixth Report of the Independent Reviewer Pursuant to Section 
14(3) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, at 1 (2011) (U.K.). 
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13. Government branches’ Influence on United Kingdom’s Anti-
terrorism Legislation 
 
The United Kingdom’s anti-terrorism legislation has changed 
significantly and repeatedly since September 11, 2001 due to the 
concerns of the various branches for human rights and the conflicts 
between the branches that resulted from these concerns.  Unlike courts in 
the United States, British courts had never ruled on indefinite detention 
until the Anti-Terrorism Act because they were barred from hearing 
human rights cases until the Human Rights Act was passed.  Due to the 
powers given to the judiciary and legislature by the Human Rights Act, 
the Joint Committee on Human Rights and the Supreme Court (with 
support from the European Court of Human Rights) forced the executive 
to change the United Kingdom’s antiterrorism legislation.  All three 
actors had an impact but their combination was crucial for legislative 
change. 
 
14.  Influence of the Judiciary 
 
The United Kingdom’s anti-terrorism legislation saga shows that the 
influence of the British judiciary and the European Court of Human 
Rights is very strong.  The executive was apparently aware of the 
judiciary’s ability to interfere with the Anti-Terrorism Act while it was 
drafting the Anti-Terrorism Act because it anticipated that judges 
(domestic or European) could use Article 5 to invalidate the Anti-
Terrorism Act’s provision for indefinite detention of non-citizens who 
were suspected terrorists.  In fact, the Derogation Order has been seen by 
some commentators as the executive’s attempt to wrest power away from 
the judiciary both in the United Kingdom and the European Court of 
Human Rights.
286
  By derogating from Article 5, the executive restricted 
available rights under the Anti-Terrorism Act and effectively eliminated 
the European Court of Human Rights’ ability to determine whether those 
rights had been breached.  The executive said that it intended to 
 
286. Danny Nicol, The Human Rights Act and the Politicians, 24 LEGAL STUD. 451, 
463 (2004). 
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essentially remove the European Court of Human Rights from the 
equation and that it could decide for itself what the risk was and what 
measures were necessary when it introduced the bill.
287
  Once it had 
derogated, the executive could evade the courts’ view of what Article 5 
required by relying on courts’ willingness to defer to the executive’s 
belief that enough of an emergency existed for it to derogate.
288
 
The Supreme Court’s Declaration of Incompatibility against the 
Anti-Terrorism Act clearly had a strong impact on the executive.  In 
response, the executive created the Prevention of Terrorism Act, which 
essentially replaced the indefinite detention in Part IV of Anti-Terrorism 
Act with control orders.  The new legislation was put in place very 
quickly – approximately three months after the Supreme Court’s decision 
in A and Others.  Further, the Home Secretary explicitly stated that the 
purpose of the Prevention of Terrorism Bill was to ensure that the law 
was made compliant with A and Others.
289
  The executive also indicated 
that, after A and Others, it had behind-the-scenes discussions with the 
Supreme Court to make sure that the Prevention of Terrorism Act was 
compatible with the Human Rights Act.
290
 
It is possible that the executive was willing to accept the 
Declaration of Incompatibility in A and Others so readily, effectively 
treating it like a statutory strike-down, because it was afraid of a similar 
ruling with regard to the renewal orders, which were secondary 
legislation and therefore could actually be struck down by the judiciary.  
If that happened, the prisoners would have to be released, so the 
executive was willing to amend the Anti-Terrorism Act with the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act’s control orders.  These control orders 
would keep the prisoners under some control and would be primary 
legislation that could not be struck down. 
The impact of the European Court of Human Rights case law is also 
apparent.  After A and Others was decided, the executive stated that it 
was creating new legislation because it feared a similar ruling by the 
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European Court of Human Rights.
291
  The Supreme Court also felt the 
European Court of Human Rights’ influence.  The fact that the European 
Court of Human Rights has historically deferred to Member States’ 
decision to derogate due to a national emergency probably strongly 
influenced the Supreme Court’s decision to defer to the executive’s 
emergency designation.
292
  The British Supreme Court’s deference is not 
surprising; British courts are required to “take into account” European 
Court of Human Rights case law when interpreting the European 
Convention on Human Rights.
293
  The Supreme Court also repeatedly 
referred to the European Court of Human Rights’ decisions and reports 
in A and Others.
294
 
After the Prevention of Terrorism Act was passed, the executive 
continued to behave strategically with regard to the Supreme Court’s 
rulings.  The executive was willing to be creative with judicial decisions 
and read them in a way that was most beneficial to the executive and its 
agenda.  All three of the Supreme Court’s decisions in October 2007 
found some European Convention on Human Rights violation, which 
should arguably have led the executive to re-examine the control orders 
for European Convention on Human Rights compliance.  Instead, the 
executive interpreted each of these decisions to mean that either the law 
did not need changing or that the Supreme Court had already made the 
appropriate changes and so no executive action was required.  For 
example, instead of accepting the British Supreme Court’s holding in JJ 
that the control orders violated right to liberty under Article 5, the 
executive took a stray remark from Lord Brown’s opinion to argue that it 
needed only to slightly reduce the curfew hours in order to comply with 
the European Convention on Human Rights.
295
 
The executive’s willingness to rely on the judiciary to fix its human 
rights infractions is also apparent here.  The executive accepted the 
Supreme Court “reading in” terms to the Prevention of Terrorism Act’s 
control order procedures to make sure they did not violate the right to a 
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fair hearing.  Moreover, the executive used that “reading in” to avoid any 
responsibility for changing the legislation itself, even though there was 
an opportunity to do so with the Counter-Terrorism Bill.  Likewise, the 
executive took E’s holding that the Secretary of State should monitor 
control orders as a simple clarification of the Secretary of State’s duties.  
With that clarification in hand, the executive saw no need to address the 
matter again, despite the Joint Committee on Human Rights’ 
protestations.
296
 
 
15. Influence of Parliament and the Joint Committee on Human  
Rights 
 
Throughout the various stages of the three antiterrorism laws, 
Parliament and the Joint Committee on Human Rights had a role to play 
and the Joint Committee’s influence seems to have grown over time.  
Every iteration of British anti-terrorism legislation was amended due to 
resistance by Parliament (particularly the Lords) and the Joint Committee 
on Human Rights.  On the other hand, the executive felt free to disagree 
with Parliament and the Joint Committee on Human Rights regarding 
most of the human rights implications of the Anti-Terrorism Act.  Even 
support by the media did not give the legislature enough power to change 
the executive’s mind on key provisions of its anti-terrorism legislation.  
Parliament, therefore, had limited power over the executive with regard 
to the Anti-Terrorism Act. 
However, the Joint Committee on Human Rights Reports’ criticisms 
of the Anti-Terrorism Act were borne out by the Supreme Court’s 
decision in A and Others, which arguably gave its later reports more 
weight within Parliament and for the executive.  Indeed, the Joint 
Committee on Human Rights typically couches its reports in terms of 
how courts will likely view legislation
297
 so the Supreme Court’s prior 
disapproval gave the Joint Committee on Human Rights much more 
ammunition with which to attack future anti-terrorism legislation.  On 
the other hand, Parliament’s role in passing the Anti-Terrorism Act did 
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influence the judiciary to adopt a more deferential position to the 
Government’s emergency designation and the reports of the various 
parliamentary committees also influenced the findings of the Supreme 
Court.
298
 
The Counter-Terrorism Bill showed the resurgence of Parliament’s 
power in the legislative process.  Although the Joint Committee on 
Human Rights did not make progress with its proposed amendments, the 
House of Lords (and very nearly the Commons) was able to effectively 
prevent the executive from instituting the forty-two days detention 
policy.  The Joint Committee on Human Rights’ other proposed 
amendments did not pass but, for at least a few of them, the executive 
promised to look at the issue.
 299
 
This promise was fulfilled after the Liberal-democrats were made 
part of the executive through their coalition with the Conservatives.  
Control orders have been reduced to TPIMs, which give more freedom to 
suspected terrorists,
300
 because of the election promises made by the 
Liberal-democrats in response to Joint Committee on Human Rights 
reports, judicial decisions and media outrage.
301
  Accordingly, it was the 
Joint Committee on Human Rights, Parliament, the British Supreme 
Court, and the European Court of Human Rights working together that 
was the most successful in convincing the executive to alter its anti-
terrorism legislation. 
This story is ongoing, particularly with regard to the power 
struggles over the renewal of control orders and the creation of the 
Conservative-Liberal-democrat coalition.  It can be expected that future 
bills will give further insight into how the three branches of the British 
government interact to create anti-terrorism law. 
 
III.    Conclusion 
 
The United States and United Kingdom began with similar anti-
terrorism legislation that allowed for their executive branches to 
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indefinitely detain suspected terrorists, particularly those who could not 
be deported.  The initial anti-terrorism laws in both countries were 
heavily impacted by the same event – the attacks of September 11, 2001 
– and the executives in both countries used the media to influence the 
legislatures to pass sweeping anti-terrorism legislation that expanded the 
executive’s powers.  Yet, the executive branches in both countries were 
met with resistance by the legislature, which forced them to amend the 
anti-terrorism legislation before it would pass.  Moreover, the laws in 
both countries were affected by the judiciary; before the fact in the 
United States and after enactment in the United Kingdom. 
The major difference between both countries is how many conflicts 
the British government experienced before reaching a stable anti-
terrorism law regime.  Several anti-terrorism bills were passed in the 
United Kingdom, each one lessening the executive’s control over 
detainees, and each one was still criticized by the legislature and 
judiciary.  However, because the British executive still controls 
Parliament and, therefore, the judiciary, it took a political shift and a 
change to the members of the executive branch and Parliament (through 
the election of the Coalition Government) before the executive was 
willing to make any major changes to existing anti-terrorism laws.  On 
the other hand, it was the strong party affiliation in the United Kingdom, 
which removed much of the legislative gridlock that plagues Congress, 
that allowed these substantial policy changes to occur.  Once the 
executive comes in to power, it can pass its legislation virtually 
unfettered.  The House of Commons generally follows its party and the 
Lords, although capable of delaying legislation, cannot block it. 
The United Kingdom’s less balanced system meant that the 
executive was originally able to pass anti-terrorism legislation that was 
much stricter than that in the United States, despite the existence of the 
European Convention on Human Rights.  However, it also meant that 
this legislation was easily undone when a new executive came into 
power.  As a result, in the United Kingdom, although restricted in their 
movements, unremovable aliens suspected of terrorism have been given 
much greater freedom than their American counterparts.  The United 
Kingdom’s anti-terrorism legislation therefore shows the effects of 
executive dominance on the creation of law. 
The United States represents a much more balanced and stable 
system; the original PATRIOT Act was never superseded by future 
legislation.  On the other hand, when drafting the PATRIOT Act, the 
49
  
2014] INDEFINITE DETENTION & ANTITERRORISM LAWS 1239 
 
executive anticipated the judiciary’s preference for reviews of detentions 
every six months and incorporated that provision into the PATRIOT Act 
without any request from the judiciary to do so.  The American Supreme 
Court has been able to make some changes to anti-terrorism legislation 
but it is limited to the cases and issues brought before it and it is also 
limited by the political affiliations of the judges, which can lead to its 
own kind of gridlock. In contrast, the change in the political affiliation of 
the executive has not had a very strong impact; Guantanamo remains 
open and indefinite detention remains a reality.  In terms of progress for 
detainees, therefore, the United State might learn from the United 
Kingdom and its willingness to amend legislation in response to political 
and popular pressure. 
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